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2Abstract
Few political observers would readily assume that a present-day politician or 
interest group’s claims about their preferences accurately reflect their 
genuine views. However, scholars often unwittingly make this very 
assumption when inferring the preferences of historical political actors. In 
this paper I explore the influence of business groups on Medicare’s passage 
to illustrate how inattention to political actors’ strategic misrepresentations 
can bias qualitative and quantitative research. An ongoing debate wrestles 
with the pattern that businesses often grant support to welfare state 
expansions just before they occur, a regularity some take as evidence that 
business interests dictate these expansions. I use Medicare as a case study 
and document that key business groups and their allies did not truly favor 
the program. However, I also show that these actors strategically 
misrepresented this preference as its passage became likely in order to 
advance more limited alternatives. The strategic nature of this position is 
exceptionally easy to miss; yet inattention to it produces the opposite, 
erroneous conclusion about these actors’ historical role. The program’s 
history thus illustrates the methodological necessity of documenting whether
political actors are misrepresenting their preferences. I discuss how scholars 
can do so by tracing actors’ stated preferences across strategic 
circumstances.
31. Did Organized Industry Favor Medicare’s Passage? How Can We 
Know?
On July 29, 1965, the day before President Lyndon Johnson signed 
Medicare and Medicaid into law, the President’s congressional aide Larry 
O’Brien circulated the guest list for the bill’s signing ceremony around the 
White House. Most scholars would not be surprised at the individuals and 
organizations the Administration invited to celebrate the passage of one of 
the Great Society’s most renowned legacies: numerous liberal Members of 
Congress, union officials, and senior citizen advocacy group representatives 
were all expected to attend. Nor, in contrast, would most scholars be 
surprised that the White House did not invite one representative of industry, 
commerce, or any other business group to the ceremony.1
Nonetheless, considerable empirical evidence seemingly suggests that 
industry groups and their allies played a crucial role in supporting Medicare’s
passage: business-friendly Republicans overwhelmingly voted for the 
measure, which included a major provision, now known as Medicare Part B, 
that was conceived by Republicans, inserted into the bill by the 
unimpeachably pro-business Rep. Wilbur Mills, and that a representative of 
the National Association of Manufactures said could be “strongly supported 
by industry.”2 Prior to the bill’s passage, the Council of State Chambers of 
Commerce likewise endorsed the view that “full and complete medical care 
should be provided those aged members of our society who cannot 
1 Guest List for the Signing of the Medicare Bill, 29 July 1965, Ex LE/IS, box 75, LBJ Library.
2 M. E. Feary to John Byrnes. 22 February 1965. Box 29, John Byrnes Papers, Wisconsin 
Historical Society.
4reasonably pay for such care themselves.”3
Consistent with what these facts seem to imply, a number of scholars 
have argued that changes in businesses’ preferences are the crucial driving 
force behind welfare state expansions, and thus that, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, business is far from the near-universal roadblock to 
the welfare state’s growth that conventional wisdom would posit. For 
example, Peter Swenson argues that changes in industry and employer 
interests principally account for welfare state growth, and Isabela Mares 
chastises scholars for “often assum[ing], rather than document[ing]” 
business opposition to the welfare programs.4 Supporting such arguments, 
scholars regularly find that, as occurred with Medicare, business groups and 
their allies have often granted their support to welfare state expansions just 
before they have occurred.
Such claims that business support drives welfare state growth have 
been vigorously contested,5 as has the broader claim that businesses reliably
exert outsized political influence.6 Yet in recent years the debate over 
business’ influence on the welfare state has reached an impasse over a 
fundamental methodological challenge: identifying these political actors’ true
policy preferences when they might have reason to misrepresent them. 
3 Testimony of Leslie J. Dikovics. United States Cong. Senate. Committee on Finance. 
Sessions on H.R. 6675. 10 May – 19 May 1965. 89th Cong., 1st sess. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965.
4 See most generally Peter A. Swenson, Capitalists Against Markets (Oxford, 2002).; Isebela 
Mares, The Politics of Social Risks: Business and Welfare State Development (Cambridge, 
2003). See next section for review.
5 See next section for review.
6 E.g., Mark A. Smith, American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections, and 
Democracy (Chicago, 2000); Cathie Jo Martin, Stuck in Neutral: Business and the Politics of 
Human Capital Investment Policy (Princeton University Press), 1999.
5Specifically, some scholars posit that businesses’ support for welfare state 
expansions simply reflects strategic acquiescence from weak political 
positions just prior to probable losses, though others point out that 
businesses might also have reasons to understate their support for these 
programs.
The impasse this particular literature has reached reflects a broader 
lacuna in scholarly knowledge with far broader implications: from literatures 
on ideal point estimation to interest group influence, identifying political 
actors’ policy preferences is a foundational starting point for numerous 
scholarly analyses of politics, yet this basic task can be surprisingly difficult 
to overcome because political actors may have reason to strategically 
misrepresent their views in a number of subtle ways.
In this paper I use Medicare’s passage as a case study to illustrate how
inattention to the possibility that political actors are misrepresenting their 
preferences can easily lead to biased inferences and mistaken attributions of
causality. I show, for example, that the seemingly clear evidence I presented
above about the National Association of Manufacturers’ support for Medicare 
is in fact deeply misleading, and that none of the actors I referenced truly 
supported the program’s passage. The possibility that seemingly 
unambiguous evidence about political actors’ preferences can in fact merely 
reflect strategic misrepresentations thus poses a fundamental challenge to 
the ‘internal validity’ of political research (that is, whether valid causal 
6conclusions are drawn from the empirical evidence).7
The paper explores these issues as follows. I first review the debate 
over business influence on the welfare state and the impasse scholars have 
reached over how to identify business actors’ preferences. I then discuss 
reasons why political actors might misrepresent their preferences and the 
challenges that this poses for researchers more generally. To illustrate these 
issues, I next turn to considering Medicare’s historical case and situate this 
case within the broader literature on how business interests influence 
welfare state development. I then document business groups’ and pro-
business politicians’ unequivocal opposition to some of the Great Society’s 
signature social programs, events on which existing accounts of the 
program’s political history are largely silent.8 In doing so, I draw much 
evidence from materials that were made available only recently, including 
President Johnson’s telephone conversations, minutes of executive sessions 
of the House Ways and Means Committee, oral histories, the papers of the 
Chamber of Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers, and the 
papers of Congressmen Wilbur Mills and John Byrnes.
This evidence demonstrates how various interest group and legislative 
actors strategically misrepresented their preferences about Medicare and 
how such misrepresentations could be remarkably easy to miss, a problem I 
7 See John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge, 2007). 
Chapter 7.
8 E.g. Lawrence R Jacobs. The Health of Nations (Cornell University Press, 1993), 157-162, 
203-206.; Jonathan Oberlander, The Political Life of Medicare (Chicago, 2003).
7follow Hacker and Pierson in calling ‘the problem of preferences.’9 In contrast
to extant approaches to this issue, however, I argue that overcoming this 
problem of preferences is crucial and in many cases achievable. Specifically, 
I show that considering how actors’ expressed preferences vary across 
strategic contexts – such as across time and audiences – is vital to 
establishing whether they are strategically misrepresenting them. Without 
such evidence, however, reliably reconstructing the policy preferences of 
political actors, even in the presence of ostensibly compelling archival 
evidence, is exceedingly difficult to accomplish. I therefore conclude by 
arguing that it should be both qualitative and quantitative research’s 
methodological obligation to explicitly defend inferences about political 
actors’ true preferences from the possibility that these actors are 
misrepresenting them.
2. Business Interests and Welfare State Development: Does The 
Welfare State Expand Because Businesses Want It To?
Most understandings of the development of the modern welfare state 
continue to follow from Walter Korpi’s premise that “the probability of 
changes in the economic organization of society depends basically on 
changes in the distribution of power resources between the contending 
classes.”10 Or, as Korpi also later wrote, that “in the capitalist democracies, it 
is fruitful to view politics as an expression of a democratic class struggle…in 
which class, socio-economic cleavages and the distribution of power 
9 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, “Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the 
Formation of the American Welfare State,” Politics and Society 30 (2002): 277-325.
10 Walter Korpi, The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism. (London: Routledge, 1978), 317.
8resources play central roles.”11
The power resource school’s assertion that businesses thus reliably 
oppose welfare state growth has come under increasing attack in recent 
decades. Most notably, Peter Swenson’s Capitalists Against Markets marshals
extensive historical evidence to argue not only that capitalist interests are 
often served by welfare state growth but that business’ interests are in fact 
chiefly responsible for welfare state expansions. In particular, Swenson 
argues that large firms have the incentive to turn over the financial burden 
for work benefit and pension programs to the state in order to better 
compete with smaller firms without these obligations. Swenson thus argues 
that the Great Depression heralded the Social Security Act’s passage 
principally due to the resulting economic changes, not the political ones 
usually identified: faced with a remade labor marketplace after the crash, he 
argues, it became in large firms’ economic interest to effectively hand over 
their retiree and pension programs to the state, thus leading to the SSA.12
Other scholars have found similar support for related theses. For 
example, Gordon argues that the Social Security Act was largely a product of
business’ “effort to ‘even out’ the competitive disparities resulting from two 
decades of private and state-level experimentation with work benefits;”13 and
11Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggles (London: Routledge, 1983), 21.
12 Peter A. Swenson. “Varieties of Capitalist Interests: Power, Institutions, and the Regulatory
Welfare State in the United States and Sweden.” Studies in American Political Development 
18 (2004): 1-29.; Swenson, Capitalists Against Markets, 5.; Peter A. Swenson, “Bringing 
Capital Back in, or, Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, 
and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden,” World Politics 43 (1991), 
513-544.
13 Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, labor, and politics in America: 1920-1935 (Cambridge, 
1994), 4, 241-2.
9Mares likewise contends that business drives welfare state expansion in 
order to solve market failures in skill formation by reducing workers’ 
reluctance to invest in industry- or firm-specific skills.14
Though Swenson, Mares, Gordon, and others explicate different causal 
mechanisms, scholars in this school of welfare state scholarship thus all 
make a similar ultimate claim: far from retarding welfare state development, 
employer interests in fact generally dictate the size of the welfare state. 
Variation in the welfare state is thus principally explained by variation in 
employer interests in this view; hence Swenson doubts that “a shifting 
balance of class power will ever explain much” about the welfare state.15 
Supporting this argument, these scholars frequently document businesses 
granting support to significant welfare state expansions, and – perhaps 
indicatively of a crucial causal role – often doing so just before they occur.
The Empirical (and Methodological) Debate
While they are novel, the claims made by this ‘business interest 
14 Mares, Politics of Social Risk. 5, 9, 264.
15 Peter A. Swenson. “Yes, and Comparative Analysis Too: Rejoinder to Hacker and Pierson.” 
Studies in American Political Development 18 (2004): 196-200. See also Peter Swenson, 
“Arranged Alliance: Business Interests in the New Deal.” Politics and Society 25 (1997): 66-
116.; Swenson, “Bringing Capital Back In.”; Gordon, New Deals.; Cathie Jo Martin and Duane 
Swank. “Does the Organization of Capital Matter? Employers and Active Labor Market Policy 
at the National and Firm Levels.” American Political Science Review 98 (2004), 593-611.; 
Edward D. Berkowitz and Kim McQuaid, Creating the Welfare State: The Political Economy of 
Twentieth Century Reform. (Praeger, 1988).; J. Craig Jenkins and Barbara G. Brents, “Social 
Protest, Hegemonic Competition, and Social Reform: A Political Struggle Interpretation of the
Origins of the American Welfare State,” American Sociological Review 54 (1989): 891-909. 
To some extent also see Torben Iversen and David Soskice, “An Asset Theory of Social Policy
Preferences.” American Political Science Review 95 (2001): 875-893.; G. William Domhoff, 
The Power Elite and the State: How Policy is Made in America (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 
1990), Chapter 4.; Jill S. Quadagno. The Transformation of Old Age Security (Chicago, 1988). 
For general review of the business interest literature see also pages 177-181 in Walter Korpi,
“Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and
Varieties of Capitalism: Protagonists, Contesters, and Antagonists,” World Politics 58 (2006): 
167-206.
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school’ have been vigorously contested by other welfare state theorists. Most
prominently, Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson argue that these conclusions 
result from a fundamental misinterpretation of the empirical evidence. It is 
often difficult, Hacker and Pierson reason, “to determine whether a particular
policy stance reflects a genuine preference or reluctant acquiescence in light
of a weak political position,” a challenge they term the ‘problem of 
preferences.’ If businesses choose to support their most favored alternative 
within the space of politically feasible options, evidence that they supported 
particular welfare state programs does not necessarily imply that they truly 
preferred these alternatives relative to the status quo: they might have been
attempting to limit the welfare state’s growth as much as possible within the 
constraints set by hostile political environments.16
Swenson rejects this explanation, however, noting businesses’ clear 
statements of support for various welfare state expansion both in the US and
abroad, including in private communications and meetings.17
Swenson, Korpi, Hacker and Pierson, and others have continued to 
debate the issue of how to interpret business’ stated support for welfare 
state expansions in Studies and elsewhere. Yet this debate has remained at 
an impasse due to the challenge Hacker and Pierson outlined: identifying 
political actors’ preferences when they might have reason to misrepresent 
them. Though some have tried, no scholar has yet offered a compelling 
solution to this problem.
16 Hacker and Pierson, “Business Power and Social Policy.”; Korpi, “Power Resources and 
Employer-Centered Approaches.”
17 Swenson, “Varieties of Capitalist Interests.”
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Far from being limited to this particular question, identifying political 
actors’ preferences is an issue that is fundamental to numerous literatures 
and research programs. Yet scholars rarely grant much attention to the 
possibility that the actors we study might misrepresent their preferences: in 
literatures from the estimation of legislators’ ideology to the influence of 
interest group money in politics, it is frequently assumed that political actors 
reveal their preferences relative to the status quo truthfully. However, 
though little work has directly confronted the challenge of how to account for
this possibility, there is good reason to think that such misrepresentations 
are pervasive and pose difficult challenges for the study of politics.
3. The ‘Problem of Preferences’
When and Why Would Political Actors Misrepresent Their Preferences?
Few political observers would readily assume that a present-day 
politician or interest group’s statements about their beliefs represent their 
genuine viewpoints. However, scholars frequently risk doing the very same 
in both qualitative and quantitative approaches to positions taken by political
actors in the past without careful attention to the reasons these actors might
have misrepresented them. The crux of the problem is succinctly stated by 
Frieden: “the position of a government representative, politician, manager, 
lobbyist, or union leader typically embeds in it calculations of what the 
impact of [taking] this position might be.”18
18 Jeffry A Frieden. “Actors and Preferences in International Relations.” In David A. Lake and 
Robert Powell, Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, 1999). For a more 
formal discussion of why political actors can be expected to behave insincerely a great deal 
of the time see Elizabeth M. Penn, John W. Patty, and Sean Gailmard, “Manipulation and 
Single-Peakedness: A General Result.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (2011): 436-
12
What such “impacts” might political actors hope to achieve by 
misrepresenting their preferences? Though no unified treatment of these 
issues exists to my knowledge, existing scholarship provides several reasons 
why actors might leave behind empirical evidence suggesting that they 
support a policy alternative that (greatly) differs from their true preference.
Overstating Support For Politically Feasible Outcomes. One way 
political actors can be expected to misrepresent their preferences is by 
overstating support for a politically feasible outcome when they judge their 
true preferences to be politically unfeasible. Specifically, actors may advance
(and indeed hope to actually achieve) a policy alternative that, while not 
their true preference relative to the status quo, is (a) more politically feasible
than their true preference, yet (b) still closer to their true preference than 
the likely policy outcome absent their actions.
For example, many pharmaceutical companies supported the 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 in exchange for particular policy concessions 
even though many appear not to have truly favored passage of the Act 
relative to the status quo, even once it contained these provisions. In other 
words, these actors appear to have expected the ‘impact’ of taking the 
compromise position preferable to the ‘impact’ of opposing the legislation, 
even though the latter strategy would have been facially more consistent 
with their true preferences.19
Similarly, businesses and their political allies who were completely 
449.
19 E.g., David Kirkpatrick, “White House Affirms Deal on Drug Cost,” New York Times (August 
6, 2009), A1.
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opposed to Medicare in any form nevertheless advanced a number of 
proposals for subsidizing the aged’s health care in order to limit the scope of 
what they deemed to be the inevitable passage of an even more expansive 
policy. Whereas in each case these actors might have squandered their 
efforts were they to advance their true preference, their efforts to advance a 
politically feasible alternative could plausibly yield substantial payoffs 
relative to the likely outcome.
In sum, actors sometimes advance policies they do not truly prefer 
relative to the status quo in order to secure an outcome closer to their true 
preference than would prevail otherwise.20
Trading Support for Access. Second, political actors sometimes 
overstate their support for a policy or another political actor in order to gain 
access to negotiations or to gain the audience of another actor. For example,
PACs generally contribute a great deal more money to members of the 
majority party in Congress. The best explanation for their doing so is that 
they perceive higher value in gaining access to Congresspeople who are 
members of the majority, not that PACs’ preferences for which members are 
re-elected regularly changes en masse at the same time party control of 
Congress does.21
Shaping ‘Policy Feedback’ Effects. Third, political actors routinely 
structure policy in such a way as to shape the subsequent political 
20 See Hacker and Pierson, “Business Power and Social Policy”, for greater discussion of this 
issue.
21 E.g., Gary Cox and Eric Magar, “How Much is Majority Status in the US Congress Worth?” 
American Political Science Review 93 (1999): 299-309.
14
environment that these policies create. As a prominent example, social 
security taxes were famously designed so as to cement a broad-based 
constituency for the program; social security tax’s deduction from every 
person’s paycheck was viewed as a key political strength of the proposal, 
even though some of its proponents did not appear to favor this idea in the 
narrowest policy terms. Similarly, as will be discussed in the case of 
Medicare, conservative Democrat Wilbur Mills appears to have essentially 
tripled Medicare in scope so as to best forestall the demand for universal 
national health insurance. Though Mills’ expansion of the program appears to
have placed policy much further from his preference in the short term, in 
creating a fairly expansive program Mills succeeded in securing an enduring 
barrier to a more broad-based government-sponsored health insurance 
program in the US. In sum, political actors often anticipate the downstream 
political consequences of proposed policies, what scholars term ‘policy 
feedback’ effects,22 and shape policies in ways that seek to shape the long-
term policy equilibrium that will result.
Withholding Support to Gain Additional Concessions. Finally, political 
actors might also overstate their opposition to a likely outcome in order to 
bring policy even closer to their ideal even when they truly support the 
alternative under consideration relative to the status quo. Though in most 
ideal point estimation frameworks, for example, legislators always vote for 
the option that is closer to their bliss point, actors might oppose options that 
22 See especially Paul Pierson, “When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political 
Change,” World Politics 45 (1993): 595-628.
15
they prefer over the status quo if they believe that even more satisfactory 
options are politically feasible. As Swenson notes, if an interest group 
believes that “there is the chance that the legislators [they are influencing] 
might tidy up a few details to suit [them] before passage – like a car 
salesman who might, for example, reduce the price or lengthen the warranty
– why show enthusiasm instead of resistance?”23 Liberal Congressional 
Democrats’ threat to vote against the 2010 Affordable Care Act if it did not 
contain a public insurance option was (an attempt to pursue) such a 
strategy.
Table 1 summarizes these broad reasons to expect that actors might 
misrepresent their preferences.24 Though the examples of preference 
misrepresentation provided are particularly stark, similar dynamics regularly 
occur in ways that can prove much more difficult for researchers to spot and 
can severely bias historical inferences. In the following pages I illustrate such
dynamics at play in such subtler forms as I revisit debates about businesses’ 
role in welfare state development with evidence from the passage of 
Medicare. I begin by reviewing crucial aspects of Medicare’s political history.
Table 1. Common Reasons Actors Misrepresent Preferences
Type of 
Misrepresent
ation
Description Sample Example
Overstating Actor voices support for an Pharmaceutical 
23 Swenson, “Yes, and Comparative Analysis Too.”
24 A final category, “Audience Effects”, might encapsulate reasons that political actors 
misrepresent their preferences to placate accountability agents who are monitoring their 
behavior, such as voters or interest group members. Political scientists well-understand such
phenomenon to exist, however, and the dynamics discussed here focus on instances where 
even a purely policy-motived, unitary actor would still choose to misrepresent their 
preferences.
16
Support For 
Politically 
Feasible 
Outcome
outcome (a) more feasible than 
their true preference but (b) 
that is also more acceptable 
than the likely outcome.
companies supporting the
2010 Affordable Care Act 
when it contained policy 
concessions even though 
they did not truly favor 
passage of the act 
overall.
Trading 
Support for 
Access
Actor attempts to gain access 
to a negotiation over a policy 
they do not truly prefer or to an
actor they do not support with 
acts of support.
PACs donating to 
members of the majority 
party in Congress 
because access to these 
members is valuable, 
even though they may 
not actually prefer these 
members’ re-election.
Shaping ‘Policy
Feedback’ 
Effects
Actor supports policy 
alternative different than their 
ideal in the short term in order 
to shape long-term political 
arrangements to satisfy their 
policy objectives.
Social security’s payroll 
taxation scheme creating 
a continuing political 
constituency for the 
program’s continuance.
Withholding 
Support to 
Gain Additional
Concessions
Actor withholds support for a 
policy they actually prefer over 
the status quo in hopes of 
securing an outcome even 
closer to their true preference.
Congressional Democrats
threatening to vote 
against the 2010 
Affordable Care Act 
without a public 
insurance option.
4. A Brief History of Medicare
Before LBJ
Medicare began its political life as a much more ambitious idea: 
government-sponsored health insurance for all Americans. After decades of 
failed attempts to build support for such proposals, which had been first 
seriously advanced in the earliest years of the 20th century, reformers in the 
early 1950s settled on advancing a new, narrower proposal: government-
sponsored health care for the aged alone. No other political system had 
targeted a health program in this way, yet the proposal promised to be more
17
politically feasible for a number of reasons: there was a strong substantive 
case to be made that the aged bore the greatest need for government 
assistance; the elderly could be expected to support the proposal in massive 
numbers; many of the young also hoped to socialize the risk they bore for 
their elderly relatives’ healthcare; and the proposal would be much less 
costly than covering all Americans.25
Yet the idea did not meet much support at first: President Truman’s 
proposal for state-sponsored health insurance for the aged received little 
backing, and President Eisenhower successfully ran against the measure 
during the Presidential campaign, branding it “socialized medicine.” Even 
after regaining control of Congress in 1954, northern Democrats who 
supported the proposal did not have nearly enough votes to advance it: in 
fact, they held no hearings on the subject until 1958, when they deemed that
the possibility for its passage first became “slight.”26
By 1960, however, it had become clear to Medicare’s foes that growing
liberal power in Congress would eventually lead some version of the proposal
to pass. Assenting to the “tactical need for federal action,” the American 
Medical Association and businesses thus helped lead the charge for a 
modest, state-based medical aid program for the indigent, hoping that this 
program would “head off the demand for Medicare.”27 For the first (and not 
the last) time during Medicare’s political life, actors opposed to it thus 
granted support to a limited version of the proposal in hopes of frustrating 
25 See Oberlander, The Political Life of Medicare, 22-25.
26 Theodore R. Marmor, The Politics of Medicare (London: Routledge, 1973), 13.
27 Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 24-30.
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efforts to enact the full plan.
This program, called Kerr-Mills, was enacted in 1960. But Kerr-Mills did 
not successfully forestall demand for Medicare as the AMA and its allies had 
hoped: the AFL-CIO and other liberal interest groups continued to 
successfully build public support for a broader plan.28 Kennedy followed suit 
as he ran for President, stressing his support for Medicare throughout the 
1960 campaign as he noticed it reliably receiving the “biggest applause 
lines” at his rallies.29 (For his part, rival candidate Richard Nixon told voters 
that “the American people…do not want, they must not have, a compulsory 
insurance plan forced down their throats, and we will not allow it.”30)
Even before his inauguration, however, Kennedy learned that a 
Medicare bill was unlikely to pass during his Presidency: Congressional 
leaders friendly to the Administration’s agenda explained that the 
conservative-dominated Senate Finance and House Ways and Means 
Committees would not support many of his legislative priorities, including 
Medicare, short of dramatic concessions. (Kennedy reportedly remarked in 
response, “When I was a Congressman I never realized how important 
Congress was. But now I do.”)31
The White House nonetheless attempted to break the conservative 
coalition’s opposition by mobilizing the public’s support. As the 
28 Ibid, 24-7.
29 David Blumenthal. The Heart of Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 
143-4.; Jaap Kooijman. …And the Pursuit of National Health. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999).
30 James L. Sundquist. Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years 
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 1968), 308.
31 Blumenthal, The Heart of Power, 139, 146, 207-12.
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Administration prepared for this push, the AMA and business groups readied 
their resistance, creating a group called AMPAC with assistance from the 
United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of 
Manufacturers. The AFL-CIO led interest group support for the bill with 
assistance from traditional liberal groups such as Americans for Democratic 
Action (ADA) and seniors groups.32
Behind the public fight between Kennedy, liberal interest groups, and 
the AMA that was ultimately waged during the Kennedy years, however, the 
Administration was aware that the AMA was largely a political “scapegoat”: 
Administration officials diagnosed their fundamental problem as the paucity 
of liberal Democrats in Congress. Nevertheless, Kennedy believed that 
Medicare made a winning campaign issue and kept the measure high on his 
agenda even as only slow progress was made into 1963.33
LBJ Comes to Power
Medicare’s most important history of consideration began under LBJ. 
After his inauguration, the new president made Medicare one of his first 
major legislative priorities, capitalizing on the martyred Kennedy’s support 
for the program and ever-cognizant of the public’s broad and ever-growing 
support for it.
Privately, however, LBJ also knew that the proposal would never pass 
without the blessing of the powerful Chairman of the Ways and Means 
Committee, Representative Wilbur Mills. In typical fashion, Johnson thus 
32 Kooijman, …And the Pursuit of National Health, 145-6.; Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 
24-7.
33 Kooijman, …And the Pursuit of National Health, 149-59.
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started courting Mills’ support for Medicare early, telling Mills that he would 
dub Medicare the “Mills bill,” assuring Mills he could claim credit for the 
legislation, and calling it the “single most important, popular thing.”34 Three 
days after calling Mills to stroke his ego, LBJ would even force Mills to sit 
through the President’s lengthy recitation of the results of a public opinion 
poll from Vermont that stressed LBJ’s popularity while arguing that the 
President’s only weakness going into the 1964 election was that he had 
“done nothing for the old folks.”35
Yet for all of Johnson’s infamous cajoling tactics, Mills did not budge in 
1964. Most importantly, Mills knew that there were not enough liberal 
Democrats to pass a Medicare bill in the House, even though he could have 
mustered the votes on the Ways and Means committee to get it to the floor. 
As he had done throughout his career, however, Mills resisted reporting any 
legislation from the committee that was not assured to pass.36 Therefore, 
34 Blumenthal, Heart of Power, 179.; Recording of Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson 
and Wilbur Mills, 3 June 1964, Citation #3642, Recordings of Telephone Conversations – 
White House Series, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.
35 Recording of Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Mills, 6 June 1964, 
Citation #3686, Recordings of Telephone Conversations – White House Series, Recordings 
and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.
36 Wilbur Cohen would later say,
“When Wilbur Mills ultimately supports you, he has done it on two counts. One, he has 
finally decided that he's in a reasonably comfortable position to be helpful, and two, 
that he has every assurance in his own mind that it will succeed. You've got to 
remember that Wilbur Mills’ opposition to Medicare and substitution to Kerr-
Mills to a great extent had to do with Wilbur Mills’ great ability to count 
heads. He wasn't going to take on a crusade that was doomed to failure.”
Also,
“Wilbur Mills was conservative in his approach to legislation. He was one fellow who,
in my dealings with him, wanted to be fully assured that a bill, once it 
reached the floor, would pass. The last thing Wilbur Mills would allow to 
happen is to bring something to the floor that would be defeated. Secondly, he
always wanted to be in a position to have a closed rule when it came to the floor so it 
could not be decimated by amendment. Once he was in that position, you could be 
very comfortable about the end result. So two things had to happen: one, Wilbur 
Mills have a change of view regarding the concept of Medicare; and two--as 
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even though a Medicare rider provision passed the Senate on September 3, 
Mills’ skepticism about its prospects in the House led him to kill the rider in 
the October 1964 Conference committee.37
The Decisive 1964 Election
The election of 1964 shattered this impasse. As James Sundquist would
record, “the 1964 Democratic landslide settled the question” of whether 
Medicare would pass;38 Theodore Marmor likewise characterized the period 
as reflecting “the politics of legislative certainty.” 
Most importantly, the historic landslide had ushered in a Congressional
environment significantly friendlier to liberal Democrats: in 69 – or nearly 1 
in 6 – seats in the United States House of Representatives now sat a 
freshman Democrat who believed they owed their victories to LBJ.39 The 
Johnson Administration shared this view of the 1964 election’s decisive role: 
in a December 1964 memo, Mike Manatos, the special assistant to the 
President, noted that, through electoral replacement alone, the 
Administration had moved from not quite having the votes to have a 
important if not more so--full and total assurance that it would pass.”
(Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XI, 7/24/86, by Michael L. Gillette, 
Internet Copy, LBJ Library.); White House legislative aide Larry O’Brien wrote to the 
President in January 1964, Mills had “great interest in fashioning a bill that [would] pass.” 
(emphasis mine, Lawrence F. O’Brien to Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 January 1964, Ex LE/IS, box 
75, LBJ Library.); Transcript, Wilbur Mills Oral History Interview II, 3/25/87, by Michael L. 
Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. This is also consistent with other scholarship on the 
period, which indicates that Mills would not allow bills to move forward unless he was certain
they would pass (Richard Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little Brown and 
Company, 1973), 54-55, 203.; John Manley, The Politics of Finance, (Boston: Little Brown and
Company, 1970), 106.; Julian Zelizer, Taxing America: Wilbur D. Mills, Congress, and the 
State, 1945-1975, (Cambridge, 1998).
37 Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 56.; Kooijman, …And the Pursuit of National Health, 159-
62. For a more detailed account of this period, see Christy Chapin, “The Politics of Medicare, 
1957-1965”, PhD Dissertation Chapter, University of Virginia.
38 Sundquist, Politics and Policy, 317.
39 Harris, A Sacred Trust, 177.
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Medicare bill pass the Senate to a situation where they would win by a 
comfortable margin.40 The election also defeated three of Medicare’s most 
dependable opponents on Ways and Means, while a change in the House 
rules precipitated by the election changed the ratio of Democrats to 
Republicans on Ways and Means from 15-10 to 17-8.41
Rank and file Members of Congress of both parties shared the view 
that the 1964 election had removed nearly all obstacles to Medicare’s 
passage: one Republican Congressman reflected, for example, “there’s not 
much we can do to stop this program”;42 Medicare’s approval was routinely 
characterized around Washington as “easy”; and Members of Congress 
perceived its popularity among the public to be unmistakable.43
In light of his newly strengthened political hand, Johnson redoubled his 
efforts to passing a Medicare law at the start of the 89th Congress, making it 
clear that the program was his first priority by arranging for the Medicare 
bills in the House and Senate to be labeled H.R. 1 and S. 1, respectively, and 
informing his legislative allies that Medicare would be first on the agenda.44
Mills changed his position after the 1964 election, too, recalling the 
following in an oral history interview in answer to a question about why he 
40 Mike Manatos to Lawrence F. O’Brien, December 8, 1964. Ex LE/IS, box 75, LBJ Library.
41 Harris, A Sacred Trust, 174.
42 Lawrence Grossback, David Peterson, and James Stimson, Mandate Politics, (Cambridge, 
2006), 1-2, 27, 45.
43 Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 57-9.; Blumenthal, The Heart of Power, 185.; Kooijman, 
…And the Pursuit of National Health, 164. The 1964 ANES illustrates the point: Medicare 
enjoyed public support by a greater than 2 to 1 margin. (Author’s analysis. The American 
National Election Studies (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political 
Studies).)
44 Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 60-1.; Recording of Conversation between Lyndon B. 
Johnson and Walter Reuther, 29 November 1964, Citation #6474, Recordings of Telephone 
Conversations – White House Series, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and 
Meetings, LBJ Library.
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supported Medicare in 1965 after representing such a notoriously 
obstreperous roadblock in the years prior:
Well, time had developed, I think, more support for it [Medicare] 
among the people. But then the election of the President 
[Johnson] in 1964 had the major impact, made the major 
difference. He had espoused it in his campaign, you know, and here 
he was elected by a 2 to 1 vote, which was a pretty strong 
endorsement of it, I thought. I thought the time had come to pass it. I 
don't think we could have passed it in 1961.45
Regardless of whether Mills was then or previously personally opposed 
to Medicare, it had at least become clear that Medicare would pass in some 
form, leaving Mills no choice except to take advantage of the measure’s 
popularity and “turn it to his own purpose.”46 Not only did Mills do so, but, in 
a coup-de-grace that would surprise everyone, he set into motion what 
would ultimately become some of the largest welfare state programs in the 
world.
Wilbur Mills’ ‘Three-Layer Cake’
What Congress ultimately passed in 1965 was more far-reaching than 
anyone in 1964 had imagined – and numerous political actors’ gross 
misrepresentation of their true preferences made it possible.
The Kennedy and Johnson Administration’s Medicare proposal, H.R. 1 in
1965, had consisted mainly of what is now known as Medicare Part A, 
45 Transcript, Wilbur Mills Oral History Interview II, 3/25/87, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet 
Copy, LBJ Library.
46 Harris, A Sacred Trust, 179.
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hospital insurance for Americans over 65 financed by a payroll tax on current
workers. Regular medical care, such as routine doctors’ visits, was almost 
entirely outside the scope of the proposed program.
In response to the overwhelming likelihood that this proposal would 
pass, however, the staunchly opposed AMA and Congressional Republicans 
thus thought their best hope for opposition was to split the broad coalition 
supporting the Administration’s hospital insurance bill by claiming that it 
didn’t go far enough, didn’t cover the most important people or procedures, 
or simply didn’t take the correct approach.47 The AMA thus drafted an 
alternative proposal known as Eldercare, which would have built off the Kerr-
Mills program and provided state-based medical aid to the poor, and poured 
nearly $1 million into advertising the plan ($7 million in 2012 terms).48
Ranking Republican Ways and Means Committee Member John Byrnes 
similarly recognized that “the discussion stage” was “over” after the 
election, recalling that: “the 1964 election…created the situation where it 
was clear that apparently there were votes enough to pass it. … All you had 
to do was read the election results in a sense to recognize that the big 
increase in Administration-elected members of the House meant that they 
would have the votes to pretty much put through something.”49 In response 
to this new political reality, Byrnes thus crafted a Republican alternative 
47 Kooijman, …And the Pursuit of National Health, 164-5.; Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien 
Oral History Interview XI, 7/24/86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library.; Wilbur J. 
Cohen to Jack Valenti, 4 March 1965, Ex LE/IS, box 75, LBJ Library.
48 Kooijman, …And the Pursuit of National Health, 164-5.; Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 
61.; Sheri I. David, With Dignity, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 126.; Harris, A 
Sacred Trust, 180.
49 Reminiscences of John Byrnes.
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largely resembling what is now known as Medicare Part B. The plan allowed 
seniors to voluntarily sign up for a federally administered insurance plan that
would cover not only hospitalization but also routine doctor’s visits and other
similar non-catastrophic services, yet that the poorest would be unable to 
afford.50
Less than two months into the 89th Congress, on March 2, 1965, the 
Ways and Means Committee held a closed session to consider these 
alternatives. Though few thought any proposal but H.R. 1 would emerge from
the session, the committee still had the three seemingly mutually exclusive 
proposals on the table before it: the Administration’s King-Anderson hospital 
insurance plan, the AMA-backed state-based means-tested Eldercare 
proposal, and the Byrnes proposal for voluntary insurance for the elderly.51
Yet after the coalitions supporting each approach formally presented 
their arguments, Mills “surprised everyone” with the unthinkable – instead of
tabling the AMA and Byrnes proposals as was expected, Mills instead 
suggested combining all three plans into one omnibus bill (in what he called 
a “three-layer cake”) that would provide a mandatory hospital insurance 
program (now Medicare Part A), a voluntary program for physicians services 
(the Byrnes plan, now Part B), and aid for the poor administered by the 
states with help from by the federal government (the AMA plan, now known 
as Medicaid).52 Underscoring the ostensibly compromising nature of this 
50 David, With Dignity, 126.; Kooijman, …And the Pursuit of National Health, 165.
51 Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 64.
52 Kooijman, …And the Pursuit of National Health, 166-8.; Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 
64.; David, With Dignity, 129.; Blumenthal, The Heart of Power, 188-9.
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combined proposal, Mills dubbed it the “medi-elder-Byrnes” bill when he 
floated it to the committee.53
This omnibus bill was approved by a party-line vote on the Committee 
and sent to the House floor. On the floor, Republicans raised a motion to 
recommit that would have substituted the three-part Mills bill with only the 
Byrnes provisions. The motion failed by 45 votes, less than the number of 
freshman Democrats elected that year: Mills’ judgment about the necessity 
of the 1964 election had been correct. Medicare then passed the House and, 
after minor modifications, the more liberal Senate on July 9. It finally became
law with the President’s signature on July 30.
With these basic historical facts established, I more extensively explore
businesses’, Byrnes’, and Mills’ activities in the following sections.
5. Businesses’ Preferences and Strategies
Did businesses play any role in Medicare’s passage? Existing literature 
provides little hint that they did. Vogel argues that Medicare “was not 
opposed by the executives of large companies”54, and few scholarly works on
Medicare make much reference to businesses’ role in opposing the program. 
By contrast, I show that the United States Chamber of Commerce and the 
National Association of Manufacturers, the two largest and most prominent 
organizations representing business, industry, and employers’ interests in 
Washington at the time, in fact actively opposed Medicare.
53 Executive Session on Medical Care for the Aged. United States Cong. House of 
Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means. 2 March 1965. 89th Cong, 1st sess. National
Archives, Washington, DC.
54 David Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America (New York: 
Basic Books, 1989).
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First, I show that the Chamber, NAM, and their affiliates were 
consistent in opposing to medical care for the aged in any form throughout 
the first half of the 1960s. As Medicare became steadily more popular, these 
groups increased their oppositional activities in turn, attempting to mobilize 
their members, friendly politicians, and public opinion against the proposal. 
Crucially, however, these groups dramatically changed these strategies 
directly following the 1964 election. Records of meetings held following the 
Democrats’ landslide explicitly record their judgment that the passage of 
some Medicare program would be inevitable in the coming Congress and 
that they thus judged the best strategy to be supporting the most limited 
Medicare program that might pass. Public and private records of these 
groups’ positions after November 1964 reflect this strategy; illustrating the 
problem of preferences, I show that much seemingly incontrovertible 
evidence that these groups supported Medicare’s passage just prior to it is 
thus in fact merely the result of their strategic misrepresentations.
Before 1964: The NAM and Chamber’s Complete Opposition
The National Association of Manufactures and Chamber of Commerce 
were both strong and unequivocal in opposing Medicare before the 1964 
election, and their reasons for doing so are clear. Nearly any Medicare 
proposal would have raised taxes with an inevitably large incidence on 
business profits – in Zelizer’s words, Medicare represented “one of the 
largest tax increases in postwar history”55 – and businesses correctly 
anticipated this. Unsurprisingly, the NAM consequently thus filed feedback 
55 Zelizer, Taxing America.
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from their members on the Medicare issue in their file labeled “Taxation.”56
Both the Chamber and NAM devoted significant resources to making 
two key arguments to Congress and the public: that Medicare was not 
needed and that it was too expensive. An information kit the NAM Employee 
Health and Benefits Committee sent to Association members in January 1960
was typical of this approach: the kit described the details of Medicare plans 
being considered in Congress, warned that they constituted “an initial step 
toward a compulsory national health insurance scheme,” and denied that the
elderly were in need of insurance, writing that “the [NAM Employee Health 
and Benefits] committee is convinced that the voluntary health insurance 
business will eventually provide insurance against the cost of medical care to
every individual who wants and needs such coverage.”57 Likewise, in flyers 
distributed to Association members on the early Forand Medicare proposal, 
the NAM noted its complete opposition and argued that “a large percentage 
of our aged population already have health insurance,” going on to predict 
that “in a relatively few short years, most of the aged population who want 
and need health insurance will have it” without any government action.58
As the environment in Washington became more favorable to Medicare
in the early 1960s, the NAM increased the volume of its oppositional 
activities. In 1961 and 1962, the Association began releasing a steady 
stream of publications continuing the attack on Medicare’s main rationale: 
56 Box 49, NAM Papers, Hagley.
57 Medical Care for the Aged Information Kit. January 1960. Box 23, National Association of 
Manufacturers Papers, Hagley Museum and Library.
58 Flyer Against the Forand Bill, 1959?. Box 23, NAM Papers, Hagley.
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the NAM distributed pamphlets to businesses in November 1961 arguing that
the program was too expensive and not “really needed”;59 in May 1962 the 
Association produced materials explaining why the approach was “not 
needed and therefore undesirable”;60 in June 1962 members of the NAM’s 
Employee Benefits committee began to give speeches across the country 
asserting that “reams of statistics” would “refute the proposition that our 
aged population is financially unable to obtain the medical and hospital care 
it needs”;61 and, finally, in 1963 the NAM Health and Benefits committee sent
a report to NAM members reiterating its position that “the proper role of the 
federal government is a simple one: encourage the continued expansion of 
voluntary health insurance by abandoning the field to private effort.”62
As the Kennedy Administration drew increasingly more public attention
to Medicare into 1963, the NAM began its own nationwide campaign to 
mobilize business owners against the program. The NAM sent weekly 
legislative bulletins to its members, keeping businesses up to date on the 
Association’s oppositional activities and asking members to join in: one NAM 
bulletin noted, for example, that “the NAM is working closely with the Health 
Insurance Association in an attempt, locally, to counteract the flood of 
favorable publicity to start the bandwagon rolling” on Medicare and asked 
members in to write letters to the editor to oppose Medicare to their local 
59 Medical Care Under Social Security, November 1961, Box 132, NAM Papers, Hagley.
60 Industry’s Viewpoint on Medical Care, May 1962, Imprints Collection, Hagley.
61 Speech by James E. Higgins at Columbia University, 12 June 1962, Box 23, NAM Papers, 
Hagley.
62 “Medical Care, Voluntary or Mandatory?”, NAM Employee Health and Benefits Committee, 
1963, Box 132, NAM Papers, Hagley.
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newspapers.63 The NAM continued to pursue this ‘local’ strategy well 
throughout 1964, mobilizing its members at key political moments: as the 
House was considering a Medicare rider in September 1964, for example, the
NAM exhorted its members that “Business action on Medicare is needed 
now,” asking businesspeople to “contact [their] congressman today, urging 
that he stand firm in opposition to any” Medicare proposal.64
Alongside their pleas to member businesses through such centralized 
communications, the NAM also directed the efforts of numerous “field staff” 
stationed across the country to mobilize local business opposition. As late as 
September 1964, the NAM’s directives to these staff instructed them to help 
the Association mobilize “MAXIMUM COMMUNICATION” from individual 
businesses to their Members of Congress to oppose Medicare, exhorting:
“INDUSTRY SHOULD CONTACT ALL MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE 
IMMEDIATELY URGING THEM TO STAND FIRM IN OPPOSITION TO ANY 
AMENDMENT TO HR 11865 PROVIDING FOR ANY SORT OF HOSPITAL 
OR MEDICAL CARE UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM.”65
Though the Chamber of Commerce’s archives do not record as 
extensive a grassroots effort, it similarly deployed its resources to building 
the public case against Medicare through publications distributed to its 
63 NAM Bulletin, 7 May 1962, Box 49, NAM Papers, Hagley.
64 NAM Memo to Members, 11 September 1964, Box 49, NAM Papers, Hagley.
65 NAM Washington Reports, 18 September 1964, NAM Papers, Hagley. The NAM also asked 
its members to exert particular pressure on Wilbur Mills and the members of the House 
Ways and Means Committee in particular, especially in wake of what the NAM termed the 
“baptism of pressure” these key politicians were reporting from “elderly-voter groups and 
organized labor.” (NAM Bulletin, March 1962, Box 23, NAM Papers, Hagley.). Indeed, even as
the Medicare bill lost ground after its 1962 defeat, the NAM told members that it “behooves 
the opposition to remain informed and active in the interim” because Kennedy and 
organized liberal groups would continue to raise the issue (NAM Bulletin, July 1962, Box 23, 
NAM Papers, Hagley); and, throughout 1962 and into 1963, a call to action opposing 
Medicare continued to command the top headline in the NAM’s weekly legislative updates to
its members. (E.g., “Adding health benefits to social security: are there basic conflicts?” June
1963. Chamber of Commerce. Imprints, Hagley Museum.)
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members. In 1963, for example, the Chamber published a series of policy 
briefs questioning the rationale for Medicare, warning that Medicare’s costs 
would spiral out of control in the future and arguing that there was “no 
crisis” of health care for the aged.66
Alongside their member mobilization strategies, national, state, and 
local leaders in the NAM and the Chamber took their case against Medicare 
directly to Congress as well, fully opposing the entire concept of state 
support for the aged’s medical care in their Congressional testimony in 1964.
Specifically, the NAM and Chamber argued that the crisis of insurance 
coverage for the elderly was simply a product of a “transitional situation” 
that would pass without any government action; that over 90 percent of the 
elderly had some health protection and thus “we do not need social security 
medicine”;67 that a “substantial portion of the aged are already covered”;68 
that the entire Medicare approach was “not needed,” and that while “some 
[of the elderly] are needy, most are not”;69 and that “the proper role of the 
Federal Government is simple: encourage the continued growth of voluntary 
insurance coverage and local assistance programs by abandoning the 
66 “A Memorandum Examining the Issue of, and the Arguments for, Social Security 
‘Medicare’.”, June 1963, Chamber of Commerce, Imprints, Hagley Museum
67 Testimony of Karl T. Schlotterbeck. United States Cong. House of Representatives. 
Committee on Ways and Means. Hearing on Medical Care for the Aged. 22 - 24 Jan. 1964. 
88th Cong, 2nd sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964.
68 Testimony of Leslie J. Dikovics. United States Cong. House of Representatives. Committee 
on Ways and Means. Hearing on Medical Care for the Aged. 22 - 24 Jan. 1964. 88th Cong, 2nd 
sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964.
69 Testimony of E. Russell Bartley [of the Illinois Manufacturers Association]. United States 
Cong. House of Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearing on Medical Care 
for the Aged. 22 - 24 Jan. 1964. 88th Cong, 2nd sess. Washington: Government Printing Office,
1964.
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field.”70 (Despite these groups’ claims, Kerr-Mills had actually failed to 
provide medical care for the aged and indigent in all but a few states;71 only 
38 percent of the aged nationwide had health insurance coverage of any 
kind.72)
In short, organized industry’s premier interest groups were totally and 
unmistakably opposed to Medicare before the 1964 election, as is made 
clear from their forceful oppositional mobilization. These groups’ publications
and statements to Congress also show that organized industry opposed not 
only the Medicare proposals being considered by Congress in 1964 but also 
Medicare in any form. The minutes of the NAM Employee Health and Benefits
committee’s meeting in May 1963 sum up this view of Medicare when they 
note that attendees felt “the [Medicare] issue…cannot logically be discussed 
on the merits”; 73 so too does the NAM’s 1964 official “Industry Beliefs” 
statement adopted by the Association’s board of directors: “protection for 
the aged against the costs of medical and hospital care should be provided 
by individual initiative.”74 Likewise, the Chamber’s position is summed up 
well in a harsh statement from their Board of Directors in June 1964, in which
they resolved to staunchly oppose “any proposal in which the social security 
trust fund would pay directly, or through any other agency, for hospital or 
70 Statement of the National Association of Manufacturers. United States Cong. House of 
Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means. Hearing on Medical Care for the Aged. 22 -
24 Jan. 1964. 88th Cong, 2nd sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964.
71 Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 36-7.
72 Hacker, The Divided Welfare State, 243.
73 Minutes of the Meeting of the Employee Health and Benefits Committee, 24 May 1963, 
Box 23, NAM Papers, Hagley.
74 NAM 1964 Industry Beliefs, 1964, Box 215, NAM Papers, Hagley.
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any other health care services rendered.”75
Although one might wonder whether these actions by the leaders of 
organized industry reflected the will of rank and file businesses, the evidence
among the NAM and Chambers’ members suggests that it did: even as the 
NAM and Chamber were softening their own institutional opposition to 
Medicare in January 1965, an opinion poll taken by the NAM showed that its 
members were nearly unanimously opposed to Medicare in any form.76
The business interest school’s claim that welfare state expansions 
occur when businesses support them thus receives no support and much 
contradiction from evidence taken just months before the program ultimately
passed: there is no evidence that any significant industry groups saw it as 
beneficial for the government to play any role in supporting the aged’s 
medical care, while the opposite is abundantly clear from their activities. Yet 
the NAM and Chambers’ public tune dramatically changed in the wake of 
their dramatically weakened political position after the 1964 election.
A Changing Political Environment: 1964 and 1965
Despite their strident opposition to Medicare before the 1964 election, 
the NAM and Chamber of Commerce began to overstate their support for the
likely outcome – that is, Medicare – as the political environment grew hostile 
to their true preferences. Read at face value, many of these groups’ 
statements and strategies thus ostensibly provide the strong support for the 
75 Minutes, 26 June 1964, Box 3, Chamber of Commerce Papers, Hagley.
76 Public Affairs Report, 27 January 1965, Box 49, NAM Papers, Hagley.
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business interest school’s thesis that its proponents have discovered directly 
prior to many other welfare state expansions – and indeed a leading 
proponent of the business interest school has concluded just this from such 
evidence.
The NAM After The Election. In late November 1964, the NAM gathered 
with the leaders of several large American corporations to discuss the next 
steps in light of Democrats’ landslide. The NAM was under no illusions about 
what the election foretold: “It appears only two members [of the US House 
Ways and Means Committee] can be depended upon to oppose Medicare,” 
the NAM informed attendees, asking them for suggestions about what to do 
in this newly “unfavorable” political environment.77
The NAM and its allies came to pursue two strategies to account for the
new political reality. On the one hand, the NAM recognized that its rank-and-
file members were staunchly opposed to Medicare, and continued to urge its 
members not to take “an attitude of surrender towards Medicare.”78 It also 
continued to produce wholly critical publications, including pamphlets 
warning that Medicare was unnecessary and arguing that it would lead to a 
compulsory system of care like Britain’s.79 The NAM likewise persisted in 
mobilizing its member businesses against Medicare: in February 1965, the 
NAM warned members: “Members of the House should be hearing industry’s 
77 Meeting of the NAM Public and Private Benefits Subcommittee, 24 November 1964, Box 
23, NAM Papers, Hagley.
78 Ibid.
79 “Facts About National Legislative Issues of Importance to All Americans.” 1965. Box 23, 
NAM Papers, Hagley.; “Do We Need Medical Assistance for the Aged Under Social Security?.”
1965. NAM, Imprints, Hagley.; “Poverty: The Sick, Disabled, and Aged”, US Chamber of 
Commerce Task Force on Economic Growth on Opportunity, 1965, Imprints, Hagley.
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views on the subject. If the volume of communication is heavy enough, 
House Members might begin lobbying their colleagues on the Ways and 
Means Committee with good effect” to stop Medicare’s progress.80
Yet even as they continued to urge their members to oppose 
Medicare’s progress, the NAM also recognized that opposition alone was 
insufficient. The NAM thus decided to support a compromise proposal fielded 
by their longtime ally Congressman John Byrnes, the Ranking Republican on 
the House Ways and Means Committee. Byrnes’ proposal, what is now known
as Medicare Part B, would have created a voluntary government-sponsored 
insurance program for the elderly. The NAM “urge[d]” its politically powerful 
members to back the proposal, for in doing so, the NAM observed, members 
could “at least” argue “for separate financing of Medicare if [Medicare’s 
passage] be inevitable.”81 The NAM also revised its official policy platform in 
the wake of this new position, replacing the sentence “the federal 
government has no place in an old age assurance program” with language 
assenting to a “basic” role.82
Though it is clear from this evidence that the NAM’s support for 
Byrnes’ plan was purely tactical (as was Byrnes’ plan itself, as I will describe 
in the next section), the NAM’s strategy of support for a more palatable 
alternative to the Administration’s plan could be easily mistaken for sincere 
support without attention to the strategic context for this proposal. In fact, a 
80 Washington Report, 15 February 1965, NAM Papers, Box 216, Hagley.
81 Meeting of the NAM Public and Private Benefits Subcommittee, 24 November 1964, Box 
23, NAM Papers, Hagley. Emphasis added.
82 NAM Policy Report, October 1965, NAM Papers, Box 23, Hagley.
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theorist in the business interest school has argued just this. In an initial 
argument about the role of business on Medicare’s passage, Peter Swenson 
points to a letter from M. E. Feary, supervisor of employee benefits at the 
NAM, who wrote to Byrnes in February 1965 that that “There are five basic 
factors in your medical program for the elderly that deserve serious 
consideration by the House Ways and Means Committee and that I 
personally believe can be strongly supported by industry. None of these 
appear in the King-Anderson bill.” These five factors were that Byrnes’ 
alternative would:
1. be administered by corporate agencies instead of the 
government;
2. limit a “drain of the public funds” because of free choice of 
participation;
3. keep financing of the program separate from social security;
4. be contributory, “restraining abuse,” and;
5. not be able to grow to excess and provide a force for political 
uses.83
Swenson interprets this letter as granting support to the theory that 
Medicare’s passage was “hardly a victory of labor and liberals over big 
business,” consistent with the business interest school’s interpretation of 
welfare state development. “There is no evidence for anything like a shift in 
a “balance of power” against capital,” Swenson concludes from the letter, 
83 M. E. Feary to John Byrnes. 22 February 1965. Box 29, John Byrnes Papers, Wisconsin 
Historical Society.
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deducing that there rather is thus “suggestive evidence of an interest shift” 
being responsible for Medicare’s passage, consistent with the business 
interest school’s expectations.84
Yet the broader context of the letter makes abundantly clear that this 
is not so: NAM noted their opposition to Medicare in any form throughout this
period, both to their members and in private; the letter merely shows that 
the NAM supported Byrnes’ efforts to pass a version of the program that was 
less offensive to their interests given that something was likely to pass. 
Consistent with this, all five of the points Feary listed in his letter are 
comparisons to the Administration’s plan (that is, the likely outcome) rather 
than to the status quo at the time. This reflects the fact that, as discussed, 
Byrnes’ proposal was explicitly pitched as the least expansive credible 
alternative that might pass given the overwhelmingly pro-Medicare political 
environment.
Fuller strategic context thus gives Feary’s letter significantly different 
meaning than an ostensibly straightforward reading would extract: it 
indicates only the NAM’s support for Byrnes’ alternative relative to the likely 
outcome (the Administration plan), and not relative to the status quo. Simply
because M. E. Feary’s letter does not explicitly mention this context as it 
professes support for Byrnes’ efforts says nothing about whether Feary or 
the NAM would have supported Byrnes’ legislation relative to the status quo. 
Swenson’s misinterpretation of the NAM’s letter illustrates how the 
84 Swenson, “B is for Byrnes and Business: An Untold Story about Medicare,” Clio (June 
2006).
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problem of preferences renders even ostensibly unambiguous private 
communications difficult to straightforwardly interpret – actors do not always
provide the relevant strategic context in their communications, though such 
context is essential to accurately identifying actors’ preferences from such 
evidence.85
Chambers of Commerce After The Election. Representatives of the 
Chamber of Commerce and various subnational Chamber chapters also took 
a newly softened stance to Congress that might be mistaken for sincere 
support. Whereas in testimony before the 1964 election industry 
representatives remained monolithically opposed to providing additional 
assistance to the elderly in any form and argued that they would receive 
adequate health coverage under the status quo (see the previous 
subsection), after the election the national Chamber publicly accepted the 
premise that a program was needed and began to argue with Congress over 
the details of what should pass.
Largely acceding to the premise that Congress would pass a health 
insurance coverage for the aged, most Chamber chapters argued that the 
best solution would be a simple increase in cash benefits for the elderly 
instead of the creation of a government medical program. The New York 
Chamber of Commerce, for example, stressed that they “support[ed] and 
urge[d] approval by Congress” a “general increase in cash benefits” because
85 For example, if one were to write a letter to one’s dentist requesting a less painful version 
of a root canal procedure, a third party reading the correspondence would not be justified in 
concluding that one would actually enjoy the surgery – the context is understood by both 
parties without being stated.
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it was “the preferable answer to the problem of health and medical costs” 
among the aged.86 Likewise, the Council of State Chambers of Commerce 
went on the record before Congress in a statement endorsed by state 
chambers’ of commerce in more than half of US states as “opposed in 
principle to providing, as a matter of right, services as distinguished from 
cash benefits under the Social Security Act” and thus pledging its support for
a cash-transfers-based approach to the problem.87 The national Chamber 
similarly registered its opposition to government administration of health 
care services, calling the idea “unsound,”88 while a representative from the 
Greater Philadelphia Commerce and Industry Council similarly told Congress 
that “the bill should encourage the retention of plans presently sponsored by
employers or carried by individuals,” instead of erecting a new government 
program.89
Yet in none of their statements did these Chamber representatives 
contest the basic new political premise that state assistance to the elderly 
86 Testimony of Mark E. Richardson. United States Cong. Senate. Committee on Finance. 
Sessions on H.R. 6675. 10 May – 19 May 1965. 89th Cong., 1st sess. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965.
87 Testimony of Leslie J. Dikovics. United States Cong. Senate. Committee on Finance. 
Sessions on H.R. 6675. 10 May – 19 May 1965. 89th Cong., 1st sess. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965.
88 Testimony of Karl T. Schlotterbeck. United States Cong. Senate. Committee on Finance. 
Sessions on H.R. 6675. 10 May – 19 May 1965. 89th Cong., 1st sess. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965.
89 Testimony of George L. Cullen. United States Cong. Senate. Committee on Finance. 
Sessions on H.R. 6675. 10 May – 19 May 1965. 89th Cong., 1st sess. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965.
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should be provided in some fashion, while many even professed support for 
government action – even though bitterly opposing these claims was their 
central strategy just months before. This change again shows how the 
‘problem of preferences’ might confound historical inference if a scholar 
considered only statements made in 1965.
For example, Leslie J. Dikovics with the Council of State Chambers of 
Commerce had argued in 1964 that a “substantial portion of the aged are 
already covered”, that the “American system of voluntary health insurance 
has done and is doing much to reduce the health care cost problem for 
millions of our aged citizens,” and therefore that any government federal 
government action would be unnecessary.90 Yet only a few months later, 
after the 1964 election, Dikovics pledged support for the idea that “full and 
complete medical care should be provided those aged members of our 
society who cannot reasonably pay for such care themselves” and indeed 
asked Congress to “improve the medical assistance for the aged program” 
through increased cash benefits.91
Similarly, Karl T. Schlotterbeck with the national Chamber of 
Commerce had argued in 1964 that support for the elderly’s medical costs 
was “not needed” as more than “90 percent” of the elderly already had 
adequate medical care and nearly the rest would have access to this care 
90 Testimony of Leslie J. Dikovics. United States Cong. House of Representatives. Committee 
on Ways and Means. Hearing on Medical Care for the Aged. 22 - 24 Jan. 1964. 88th Cong, 2nd 
sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964.
91 Testimony of Leslie J. Dikovics. United States Cong. Senate. Committee on Finance. 
Sessions on H.R. 6675. 10 May – 19 May 1965. 89th Cong., 1st sess. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965.
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soon; the problem was “transitional” and “of decreasing proportions,” 
according to Schlotterbeck in 1964, and therefore could be expected to go 
away on its own.92 Yet in 1965 Schlotterbeck noted that “the national 
chamber agrees that some of the retired elderly have a problem of paying 
for needed hospital and related care” and argued that cash benefits were the
best way for the federal government to accomplish this goal.93
Table 2. Selected National Association of Manufacturers and 
Chamber of Commerce Statements Before and After November 1964
Date Business Position
Before November 1964
June 1962 NAM distributes pamphlets to businesses arguing that the 
Medicare was “not needed and therefore undesirable.” 
Employee Benefits Committee members give speeches 
claiming that “reams of statistics refute the proposition that
our aged population is financially unable to obtain the 
medical and hospital care it needs.”
May 1963 NAM Employee Health and Benefits committee attendees 
register that “the [Medicare] issue…cannot logically be 
discussed on the merits.”
June 1963 Chamber of Commerce publishes policy briefs questioning 
the rationale for Medicare, arguing that there was “no 
crisis” of health care among the aged.
January 1964 Karl T. Schlotterbeck of the national Chamber of Commerce
testifies to Congress that “we do not need social security 
medicine,” accompanied an official statement from the 
NAM itself that “the proper role of the Federal Government 
is simple: encourage the continued growth of voluntary 
insurance coverage and local assistance programs by 
abandoning the field.” Leslie J. Dikovics of the Council of 
State Chambers of Commerce testifies that “a substantial 
portion of the aged are already covered.”
September 
1964
NAM directs field staff to mobilize “MAXIMUM 
COMMUNICATION” to Congress to oppose Medicare, 
accompanied by a statement of “Industry Beliefs” adopted 
92 Testimony of Karl T. Schlotterbeck. United States Cong. House of Representatives. 
Committee on Ways and Means. Hearing on Medical Care for the Aged. 22 - 24 Jan. 1964. 
88th Cong, 2nd sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964.
93 Testimony of Karl T. Schlotterbeck. United States Cong. Senate. Committee on Finance. 
Sessions on H.R. 6675. 10 May – 19 May 1965. 89th Cong., 1st sess. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965.
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by the Board that “protection for the aged against the costs
of medical and hospital care should be provided by 
individual initiative.”
After November 1964
Late 
November 
1964
NAM “urges” its politically powerful members to back 
Byrnes’ Medicare proposal, what ultimately became 
Medicare Part B.
February 
1965
NAM tells Byrnes that his alternative proposal could “be 
strongly supported by industry.” 
May 1965 Schlotterbeck of the national Chamber of Commerce tells 
Congress that “the national chamber agrees that some of 
the retired elderly have a problem of paying for needed 
hospital and related care” and argues that an increase in 
cash benefits is the best way to accomplish this goal.
May 1965 Dikovics of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce 
pledges support for the idea that “full and complete 
medical care should be provided those aged members of 
our society who cannot reasonably pay for such care 
themselves” and asks Congress to “improve the medical 
assistance for the aged program” through increased cash 
benefits.
Table 2 presents a representative selection of business’ statements 
before and after the decisive November 1964 election to help illustrate this 
shift in their expressed preferences. Examining business’ statements and 
strategies from after the election alone underscores how easily the problem 
of preferences can be overlooked. How much more unambiguous can one be,
a scholar could argue, than when the Council of State Chambers of 
Commerce explicitly asked Congress to “improve the medical assistance for 
the aged program”? Yet fuller historical context shows that industry’s stated 
support was a reflection of its understanding that some program would pass:
the historical record documents these groups’ appraisal of the environment 
after the election as markedly more “unfavorable” to their interests as well 
as their rapid shift in position following it given that they deemed the 
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program’s passage “inevitable.”94 Taking evidence from this latter period at 
face value, even when it is drawn from private sources (as Swenson did with 
Feary’s letter), would thus lead one to substantially misinterpret organized 
industry’s true preferences, and hence to misidentify their degree of 
influence and power as well.
Of course, this evidence regarding the Chamber’s and the NAM’s 
behavior does not necessarily speak to all businesses’ interests or 
preferences at the time; as recent work has cautioned us, scholars often too 
readily elide the distinction between certain prominent businesses’ interests 
and “business interests,” and those who chose to join these business 
associations may not be representative of all businesses.95 However, the 
Chambers and the NAM were widely recognized as the banner interest 
groups representing businesses’ preferences at the time,96 the archives do 
not record any other business groups as being nearly as active on the issue, 
and, as discussed, these groups’ rank and file members appeared to support 
their actions. There is also no evidence that these groups were more hostile 
to Medicare than other, less prominent business actors were at the time. 
Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that these groups were not 
necessarily representative of all businesses’ views.
6. Byrnes, Businesses, and Part B: “Opposition to Medicare Is Not 
94 Meeting of the NAM Public and Private Benefits Subcommittee, 24 November 1964, Box 
23, NAM Papers, Hagley.
95 E.g., David M. Hart. ““Business” Is Not An Interest Group: On the Study of Companies in 
American National Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 7 (2004): 47-69.; Martin, 
Stuck in Neutral.
96 E.g., Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 18.
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Enough”
Though it may seem obvious to remark that politicians often 
misrepresent their preferences in public, in this section I explore how 
politicians’ seemingly clear private actions and statements can still be quite 
easily misinterpreted without careful attention to their strategic context.
As the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, few people in Washington were in a better position to shape 
Medicare’s final passage than were Wilbur Mills and John Byrnes, and indeed 
both deserve great credit for crafting significant aspects of the sizeable 
social welfare program that Medicare still is today (albeit inadvertently on 
Byrnes’ part). Yet both men were also among businesses’ most dependable 
allies in Congress, raising the question of whether these unimpeachably pro-
business politicians might have anticipated businesses would develop 
support for Medicare after its passage despite their clear opposition at the 
time. Indeed, Swenson argues that businesses have provided such 
retroactive support in numerous historical instances and that the anticipation
of such retroactive support is often responsible for the pattern that pro-
business politicians frequently voice support for welfare state expansions in 
the cases when businesses have actively opposed them.97 Thus, even if one 
accepts that the NAM and the Chamber of Commerce were truly opposed to 
Medicare in 1965, the business interest school might counter that business 
interests were still responsible for the program’s passage because Byrnes or 
Mills expected that Medicare would be good for business and “ultimately 
97 See Swenson, “Varieties of Capitalist Interests,” 22.
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accepted [by business] as such.”98
In this section I show that this argument receives no support from the 
historical record, but that again much historical evidence could be easily 
misread in favor of it. Instead, the historical evolution of Byrnes’ position on 
Medicare makes clear that he and the Republicans did not truly favor his Part
B proposal over the status quo, though they stridently claimed to support it 
as a part of their political strategy. Indeed, the historical record chronicles 
Byrnes’ explicit view that Part B was borne out of political strategy alone, 
verifying what an analysis based on the historical evolution of his views and 
tactics imply.
There are a number of compelling reasons to expect that Byrnes would
act in accordance with businesses’ dominant interests on the Medicare issue.
The NAM had long provided substantial support to the campaigns Republican
Members in Congress through both financial contributions and in the form of 
grassroots efforts by association members to re-elect Republicans.99 In the 
context of Medicare, as reviewed in the last section, Byrnes had also closely 
coordinated with the NAM throughout the program’s consideration by 
Congress.
What then of the possibility that Part B was not Byrnes’ best attempt to
limit Medicare’s size but in fact a program that he genuinely supported 
because he believed that businesses would too?
Byrnes’ private memoranda constitute the firmest demonstration that 
98 Swenson, “B is for Byrnes and Business,” 6.
99 NAM Political Files, Box 5, NAM Papers, Hagley.
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his 1965 proposal should be read as nothing but reluctant acquiescence. The
evolution of the positions Byrnes took as the political climate changed 
illustrates how strategic circumstances are crucial to how political actors 
choose to represent their preferences.
Echoing the Chamber of Commerce and National Association 
Manufacturers’ strategies before the 1962 election, Byrnes advised his 
Republican colleagues that it would be “of use” in their “campaign for re-
election” to spread the message that Kennedy’s Medicare program was “not 
necessary” since “at the present over 75 percent of the entire civilian 
population – young and old – have some type of health insurance. By 1970, it
will be 90 percent.”100 (Of course, this was false.) In November 1963, 
Republicans’ strategy remained largely the same: the Assistant council to 
Republicans on the Ways and Means Committee, David West, wrote to 
Byrnes that even as Medicare was becoming more popular among the public,
he felt it would be best for Republicans to continue their strategy of 
proposing small changes to the state-based Kerr-Mills framework to limit 
demand for a larger program, exactly what Byrnes did.101
Yet, as political pressure to pass Medicare mounted following 
Kennedy’s assassination and Johnson’s ascendancy, some rank-and-file 
Republicans began to file bills that went beyond the Kerr-Mills framework. 
The response from Byrnes’ office was clear disapproval. West reprimanded 
100 Dear Colleague Letter, 1 October 1962, box 32, John Byrnes Papers, Wisconsin Historical 
Society.
101 David West to John Byrnes, 18 November 1963, box 34, John Byrnes Papers, Wisconsin 
Historical Society.
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Republican members of the committee in a February 1964 memo, tersely 
writing: “The introduction of such bills constitutes at least an implied 
admission that existing laws are inadequate. If the trend toward the 
introduction of such bills continues, it may be impossible for the Ways and 
Means Committee not to take some action in this area.”102 Reflecting this 
strategy, Byrnes also continued to argue that the Kerr-Mills approach was 
sufficient and that medical care for “all the aged, irrespective of need” would
be economically infeasible.103
After the 1964 election, however, Byrnes’ strategy changed 
dramatically. Only then did Byrnes draft the Republican alternative largely 
resembling what is now known as Medicare Part B. The plan allowed seniors 
to voluntarily sign up for a federally-run government insurance plan that 
would cover not only hospitalization but also routine doctor’s visits and other
similar non-catastrophic services, yet that the poorest would be unable to 
afford.104
Table 3. The Evolution of Byrnes’ Strategies, 1962-1965
Date Byrnes Position
Fall 1962 Urges Republicans to claim that by 1970 over 90 percent of 
the population young and old will have insurance so any 
further changes are “not necessary.”
Fall 1963 Seeks to expand the Kerr-Mills program in order to “postpone 
or frustrate the effort to enact the King-Anderson bill.”
Spring 
1964
Advocates proposal to raise minimum social security benefits 
slightly to help defer the cost of medical care, without 
explicitly earmarking funds for medical care as such. Argues 
102 Memo from David West, 3 February 1964, Box 34, John Byrnes Papers, Wisconsin 
Historical Society.
103 John Byrnes to John Reynolds, 18 September 1964, Box 34, John Byrnes Papers, Wisconsin
Historical Society.; Reminiscences of John Byrnes, 1967, Butler Library Oral History 
Collection, Columbia University.
104 David, With Dignity, 126.; Kooijman, …And the Pursuit of National Health, 165.
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that offering medical care for the aged irrespective of need is 
economically infeasible.
Fall 1964 Argues that government should support the purchase of 
voluntary private health insurance plans through tax credits 
and deductions of premiums from income taxes.
Spring 
1965
Tells Republicans: “Opposition to Medicare is not enough.” 
Proposes opt-in federally-run insurance plan for doctor’s visits.
Table 3 summarizes this evidence, drawn entirely from Byrnes’ own 
records and statements. Though this evolution of Byrnes’ strategies before 
and after the election merely strongly suggest that his Part B proposal was 
not his true preference, Byrnes’ papers and oral history interviews explicitly 
indicate that this was the case. In fact, Byrnes fully admitted that the 
measure was not warranted on policy grounds, he thought it “incumbent 
upon Republicans to offer a sound alternative” plan so that Republicans 
could attack politically “vulnerable” aspects of the Administration’s proposal.
Byrnes also hoped that once his plan was inevitably rejected, the 
Republicans would at least have a “we-told-you-so advantage” in the event 
that any aspect of Medicare’s implementation went poorly. “Opposition to 
Medicare is not enough,” Byrnes thus wrote in a memo to Republicans in 
January 1965, “It is incumbent upon the Republicans to offer a sound 
alternative.”105 William Quealy, the Republican staff counsel on the Ways and 
Means Committee (and thus Byrnes employee) similarly urged the move as 
he told the Republican committee members that they needed to “face 
political realities.”106
As Byrnes later reflected, he had realized that “the discussion stage” 
105 Reminiscences of John Byrnes.
106 Marmor, The Politics of Medicare. 63.
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was “over” after the election, recalling that: “the 1964 election…created the 
situation where it was clear that apparently there were votes enough to pass
it. … All you had to do was read the election results in a sense to recognize 
that the big increase in Administration-elected members of the House meant 
that they would have the votes to pretty much put through something. … It 
was perfectly apparent that the truck was on the road and it was all gassed 
up and going. … The politics of the thing dictated that there was going to be 
passage of a federal program.”107
Byrnes’ statements at the time and later recollections thus verify that 
his Part B proposal was exactly what the historical evolution of his actions 
implies: merely an effort to offer a less expansive political “substitute” to the
Administration’s proposal given unfriendly political circumstance. A journalist
at the time thus recorded that Byrnes’ plan was:
“generally dismissed as a political grandstand play, and Byrnes 
himself privately conceded that the bill had no chance. … 
Although the Republicans might have no hope of getting the 
measure through Congress, they could be counted on to use it 
later as an example of how they had been trying to take care of 
old people when the Democrats betrayed them with a halfway 
piece of legislation.”108
Moreover, Mills’ surprise move of including the Byrnes provisions in the
“three-layer cake” took Byrnes himself completely off guard and cannot be 
read as a Byrnes coup. The move left Byrnes “stunned” according to those 
present: one observed noted that Byrnes “just sat there with his mouth 
open” after Mills’ move, and Byrnes himself later told a journalist that Mills’ 
107 Reminiscences of John Byrnes.
108 Harris, A Sacred Trust. 181, 186.
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move was “quite a surprise” to him.109 Indeed, as Mills had hoped, the 
minutes of the closed session, released only recently, show that Byrnes 
attempted but had difficulty forming a coherent argument against the 
combination bill since it contained the very ideas he had been strategically 
championing.110 Once the meeting ended and news leaked to the press, the 
AMA was “horrified;”111 after spending more than $900,000 to advertise the 
Administration’s bill’s inadequacy, their own advocacy had been turned 
against them to create a plan more far-reaching than any had realized was 
possible.112
Mills thus harnessed Republicans’ claims that the administration-
backed hospital insurance proposal was inadequate to fashion a bill that was 
“unassailable politically from any serious Republican attack” in the 
Administration’s estimation.113 HEW Secretary Wilbur Cohen likewise called 
Mills’ move “one of the most skillful political maneuvers [he’d] seen in thirty 
years,”114 since, as he gloated to the press a year later, “The doctors couldn’t
complain, because they had been carping about Medicare’s shortcomings 
and about its being compulsory. And the Republicans couldn’t complain, 
because it was their own idea. In effect, Mills had taken the AMA’s 
109 Harris, A Sacred Trust. 187-8.
110Executive Session on Medical Care for the Aged. United States Cong. House of 
Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means. 2 March 1965. 89th Cong, 1st sess. National
Archives, Washington, DC.
111 David, With Dignity, 131.
112 Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 63.; An AMA official commented “I never thought we’d 
end up spending several million dollars in advertising to expand the bill.” (Harris, A Sacred 
Trust, 188.)
113 Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 64. Emphasis added.
114 Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XI, 7/24/86, by Michael L. Gillette, 
Internet Copy, LBJ Library.
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ammunition, put it in the Republicans’ gun, and blown both of them off the 
map.”115 LBJ’s legislative aide Larry O’Brien similarly remembered that “[Mills’
move] didn't eliminate opposition, but suddenly you're looking at a piece of 
legislation that effectively rebutted these claims made over the years of 
ineffectiveness.”116 Other Administration officials commented that with the 
move the opposition was “outfoxed,”117 that “the wind was taken out of 
[their] sails,”118 and that it had left Democrats completely “off the hook” 
politically.119 Mills himself recalled that Byrnes had thus “painted himself into 
a corner,”120 while LBJ referred to Mills as having “stole[n]” the provision from
Byrnes.121 As Johnson would later crassly observe, Mills thus left the AMA and 
Byrnes “knee-deep in their own shit.”122
Within the context of Byrnes’ previous actions and the changing 
political climate there is thus strong evidence Byrnes’ 1965 proposal was 
only intended to limited Medicare’s scope as much as possible, even though 
this was not its ultimate effect. In light of Byrnes’ prior public statements 
before the 1964 election and his private admissions at the time, there is little
reason to believe that Byrnes’ 1965 actions and statements came from a 
position of sincerity.
115 Harris, A Sacred Trust. 187.
116 Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XI, 7/24/86, by Michael L. Gillette, 
Internet Copy, LBJ Library. (emphasis mine).
117 Transcript, Douglass Cater Oral History Interview, 5/26/74, by David G. McComb, Internet 
Copy, LBJ Library.
118 Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XI, 7/24/86, by Michael L. Gillette, 
Internet Copy, LBJ Library.
119 Wilbur J. Cohen to Jack Valenti, 4 March 1965, Ex LE/IS, box 75, LBJ Library.
120 Harris, A Sacred Trust, 190.
121 Recording of Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Cohen, 11 March 1965,
Citation #7141, Recordings of Telephone Conversations – White House Series, Recordings 
and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.
122 Kooijman, …And the Pursuit of National Health, 178.
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Note, however, that one would completely mistake Republicans’ true 
preferences by considering only Byrnes’ actions just prior to Medicare’s 
passage: Byrnes directed his efforts towards advocating several alternative 
proposals to Medicare with business support for his efforts; and, Republicans 
nevertheless overwhelmingly voted for the final bill. Indeed, Swenson claims 
that Mills “jumped” on Byrnes’ idea lest the Administration’s proposal be 
rejected and Byrnes’ proposal be substituted in its place on the House floor. 
The inclusion, Swenson thus argues, illustrates a “cross-class alliance” 
without which the bill would not have passed.123 Yet the facts Swenson 
identifies provide no evidence for his assertions when these actors’ strategic 
contexts are fully taken into account, an interpretation that Byrnes’ explicit 
statements confirm.124
Byrnes’ memoranda thus further illustrate how even private materials 
can be subject to the problem of preferences and the resulting difficulty in 
interpretation. Just as industry groups expressed more support in any form 
for Medicare after political circumstances forced their hand, Byrnes only 
supported Medicare after November 1964. This evolution is not surprising 
123 For more on the concept of a cross-class alliance, see Mares, The Politics of Social Risk.
124 As a coda to this discussion, one might argue that Mills was forced to include Byrnes’ Part
B idea in order for the bill to pass, even if Byrnes had not intended to assist Medicare’s 
passage. However, as documented exhaustively, the 1964 election left no doubt that the 
Administration’s bill, King-Anderson, was sure to pass. Even on the very day Mills was about 
to execute his “three-layer cake” coup, LBJ was expressing his confidence to his Vice 
President, Hubert Humphrey, that the Administration’s King-Anderson bill would easily pass 
in its current form. (Recording of Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Hubert 
Humphrey, 2 March 1965, Citation #7024, Recordings of Telephone Conversations – White 
House Series, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.) The 
minutes of the committee’s fateful meeting on March 2, 1965 similarly contain no hint that 
Byrnes was anything but sharply displeased that Mills co-opted his provisions. (Executive 
Session on Medical Care for the Aged. United States Cong. House of Representatives. 
Committee on Ways and Means. 2 March 1965. 89th Cong, 1st sess. National Archives, 
Washington, DC.)
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given what transpired in American politics during these years; however, it 
does illustrate how misleading each of these private statements might be in 
isolation, no matter how clear they might appear (such as Byrnes’ full-
throated endorsement of his Part B proposal in a closed session of the Ways 
and Means Committee (just prior to his horror that Mills superficially 
accepted it)). In concluding, to paraphrase Byrnes himself, political actors 
often find that it is not the best strategy to simply oppose that which one 
opposes.
7. Wilbur Mills’ Two Constituencies
Despite businesses’ and the Republican’s own clear opposition to 
Medicare, Wilbur Mills’ impeccable pro-business credentials ostensibly lend 
circumstantial evidence to the claim that organized industry’s allies in 
Congress thought they might ultimately come to support Medicare: after all, 
Mills was as reliably friendly with businesses as any Member of Congress and
appears essentially solely responsible for the Medicare bill’s dramatic 
expansion in scope in March 1965. Yet Mills’ papers paint a much more 
complicated picture about his relationship with businesses on this issue.
Before 1965, Mills’ reputation in general and with organized industry 
was primarily based on his stance on taxes, a natural role for the Chairman 
of the Ways and Means Committee. In this regard, Mills defined himself as a 
tax cutter and reformer: Time Magazine featured Mills on its cover in January
1963 for a story about his proposal to overhaul the tax code and reduce 
federal taxes, after which numerous businessmen wrote him to congratulate 
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him on the publicity and laud his continuing efforts.125 Mills also routinely 
gave interviews to business publications to promote his tax cutting 
proposals, such as for an article in National Business Magazine in August 
1964, “Wilbur Mills Talks on Taxes.”126
Yet despite his close relationship with organized industry, Mills’ papers 
imply that he did not view businesses as an ally for Medicare’s passage. 
Specifically, the content of remarks he made to meetings of numerous 
business groups in Arkansas shed light on his own understanding of these 
groups’ priorities and opinions.
Mills’ preparations for a speech he gave in January 1962 to the 
Arkansas Chamber of Commerce typify the Congressman’s approach. One of 
Mills’ aides wrote a first draft of the speech touting the limited Kerr-Mills 
program and claiming that it had already made “remarkable” progress. Yet 
Mills himself decided to cut the reference in the final version of the speech, 
and did not mention health benefits at all in his lengthy remarks about 
various proposals pending before Congress.127 Likewise, in numerous 
speeches before the 1964 election to local chambers of commerce and to 
the management of local corporations, Mills spoke at great length about the 
many proposals he expected to champion in the following Congress but 
125 “The Congress: An Idea On The March.” Time Magazine 11 January 1963. See associated 
correspondence in Box 277, Wilbur Mills Papers, Bailey Library, Hendrix College.
126 “Wilbur Mills Talks On Taxes.” National Business Magazine August 1964. Box 410, Wilbur 
Mills Papers. For more on Mills and his relationship with business, see Zelizer, Taxing 
America.
127 Materials for Speech for the Arkansas Chamber of Commerce on January 1962. Wilbur 
Mills Papers, Box 784.
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never once raised the issue of Medicare with these audiences.128 Indeed, in all
of Mills’ many speeches to business groups in 1964, the one speech that 
appears to reference Medicare even indirectly occurred after the election, in 
December, when Mills spoke to the Paragould Chamber of Commerce. Yet 
even then, Mills only generally commented that while there were many 
“worthwhile priorities” that the following year’s Congress would consider, 
among which Medicare was one of many, he did not believe that government
should use the power to tax to support priorities merely because they were 
desirable.129
Perhaps even more indicatively, even after Medicare passed, Mills’ 
apparent assessment of businesses’ support for the combined three-part 
policy he crafted appeared to remain similar. In speeches in November 1965,
Mills travelled across Arkansas to visit local Chambers of Commerce and 
claim credit for the many proposals he had shepherded through the Ways 
and Means Committee during the historically productive 89th Congress. Yet 
despite these speeches’ great length and scope, Mills consistently declined 
to claim credit for Medicare’s passage in front of businessmen,130 despite the 
fact that most would single out the program as the signature achievement of
his legislative career.
In fact, I only found one exception to Mills’ tendency to avoid 
128 E.g. Speech for the Heber Springs Chamber of Commerce, Box 590, Wilbur Mills Papers.; 
Speech for the Associated Wholesale Grocery, Box 591, Wilbur Mills Papers.
129 Speech for the Paragould Chamber of Commerce, Box 600, Wilbur Mills Papers.
130 See Speech to Little Rock Jr. Chamber of Commerce on November 4, 1965, and Speech to
Arkansas State Chamber of Commerce, November 10, 1965, among others, Box 658, Wilbur 
Mills Papers.
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discussing his position on Medicare with businesses in his papers, an 
example which further reinforces this argument. In January 1965, right after 
Johnson had announced that Medicare was his top legislative priority in the 
coming Congress, Mills devoted only one paragraph to Medicare in a speech 
to the Chamber of Commerce of West Memphis, Arkansas. In it, Mills 
distanced himself from the proposed plan, being careful to note that the 
proposal came from Johnson and feigning ignorance about how the Ways and
Means Committee would receive the Administration’s proposals.131
Yet even as Mills eschewed discussing Medicare with businesspeople in
his district, he spoke of it quite readily and frequently when among another 
group of his constituents – the elderly. When speaking to a Kiwani’s 
convention in Arkansas in September 1964, for example, Mills sought to 
deflect criticism that he had opposed Medicare’s passage in 1964, referring 
to his “deep concern … over using the [OASDI] system for financing a 
medical or hospital care program” but stressing that he believed the 
program was necessary and would pass.132 Similarly, he told the Lion’s Club 
on December 2, 1964 that “we are not in a contest of wills among 
responsible persons or agencies about whether the aged need adequate 
health benefits.”133
Table 4. Mills’ Position on Medicare, 1962-1965, Across Audiences
Date Audience Mills Position
To Business Groups
January Arkansas Cuts reference to Kerr-Mills program in 
131 Speech to the West Memphis Chamber of Commerce on January 15, 1965, Box 782, 
Wilbur Mills Papers.
132 Speech to the Kiwani’s Convention, September 28, 1964. Box 592, Wilbur Mills Papers.
133 Speech to the Lion’s Club, December 2, 1964, Box 600, Wilbur Mills Papers.
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1962 Chamber of 
Commerce
speech, does not mention Medicare in lengthy
legislative update despite his central role in 
ongoing negotiations.
October 
1964
Local Chambers
of Commerce; 
management of
local grocer
Spoke at great length about the many 
proposals he expected to champion in the 
following Congress but never elected to 
discuss Medicare despite its central role in the
ongoing Presidential campaign.
Decemb
er 1964
Paragould 
Chamber of 
Commerce
Said that LBJ supported many “worthwhile 
priorities,” including Medicare, but disavowed 
belief that government should use power to 
tax to support such priorities merely because 
they were desirable.
January 
1965
West Memphis 
Chamber of 
Commerce
Distances himself from proposed plan, noting 
that the Medicare was Johnson’s proposal and 
feigning ignorance about how the Ways and 
Means Committee would act on it.
Novemb
er 1965
Local Chambers
of Commerce
Claims credit for many proposals passed 
during the historically productive 89th 
Congress, though never claims credit for 
Medicare in front of businessmen.
To Elderly Groups
Septemb
er 1964
Kiwani’s 
Convention
Stressed his belief that Medicare was 
necessary in some form and would pass; 
claimed that his prior opposition was due to 
technical concerns that could be overcome.
Decemb
er 1964
Lion’s Club “We are not in a contest of wills among 
responsible persons or agencies about 
whether the aged need adequate health 
benefits.”
Such patterns, summarized in Table 4, have clear implications for 
inferences about Mills’ own perceptions of the political economy of Medicare.
Mills did defend his reputation on Medicare in front of the elderly, but among 
businessmen never elected to discuss the issue much less emphasize his 
support.
Though this evidence alone does not necessarily indicate that Mills 
thought all businesses were opposed, it does suggest that most businesses 
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were at best indifferent in Mills’ estimation. In concert with the evidence 
from the previous sections and what we know about Mills’ very close 
relationship with business groups,134 however, Mills’ reticence on the 
Medicare issue in front of businesses in Arkansas paints the picture of a 
politician trapped between one of his most powerful and core constituencies 
and a political tidal wave in the US House and among the public. It is no 
surprise that the NAM chose, of all figures, to ask its members to reach out 
to Mills in particular during key moments in the Medicare fight – he had 
always proven to be their dependable ally. Yet businesses’ opinion could not 
wholly determine his actions.
Mills’ actions stand in striking contrast to what the business interest 
school would assert; Mills did and said little that would suggest that he saw 
organized industry as a potentially supportive constituency for Medicare, 
while the evidence implies much the opposite. There is no evidence that Mills
expected to be able to cultivate business support for Medicare, either. Were 
Mills asked to provide his view on the business interest school, his behavior 
implies that he would almost certainly be a strong skeptic.
More broadly, Mills’ actions also illustrate another way that researchers
can identify how political actors’ strategic context shapes their expressed 
preferences: by tracing how their actions change across strategic contexts 
within time (in addition to over time). Exploring how strategic context within 
time mediates the policy preferences actors claim to have can thus yield 
crucial insight into their perceived strategic environment.
134 See Zelizer, Taxing America.
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8. Conclusion: Business and the Welfare State
This paper presented evidence that Medicare’s passage cannot be well
explained by changes in businesses’ interests. While a traditional power 
resources account well explains the observed pattern – a considerable 
decline in the political power held by organized industry’s main allies brought
about by the election of 1964 – there is no evidence for a shift in businesses’ 
interests or these interests’ importance, empirically or theoretically, between
the early 1960s and when Medicare passed in 1965. The nation’s banner 
organized business groups behaved as many scholars would predict135 on an 
issue of such high salience to which they were so clearly opposed: by 
enlisting local businesspeople to lobby their Members of Congress and 
endeavoring to turn public opinion against the measure.
They were not successful. Indeed, in stark contrast to what the 
business interest school would predict, what is perhaps most remarkable 
about politicians’ behavior on the Medicare issue is how indifferent key 
actors appeared to organized industries’ preferences. Consider, for example, 
Wilbur Mills’ words when speaking privately with LBJ about his three-pronged
proposal. Mills said the following with regards to the insurance industry, one 
of the most powerful lobbies in Washington:
Don’t you worry one minute about these doctors and insurance
companies organizing against this bill. We have written the 
insurance people, we must admit, completely out of the bill for 
people over 65. …the insurance people are going to oppose it, 
there’s no doubt about that. They were going to oppose HR 1. 
135 E.g., Smith, American Business and Political Power, 10-11.; Pepper D. Culpepper, Quiet 
Politics and Business Power (Cambridge, 2011).; Martin, Stuck in Neutral.
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They were going to oppose anything we did.136
Of course, this quote from Mills does not refute the claim that he acted 
in capitalist interests more broadly sometimes or even frequently – as 
mentioned, Mills frequently courted business support through a variety of 
means. Yet it does illustrate how brazenly Mills was willing to abrogate the 
clear preferences of this powerful interest group, seemingly in favor of what 
he perceived as the public’s demands.
Johnson’s strategy for coping with organized interests who were 
opposed to Medicare was even more aggressive: Johnson largely reacted to 
interest group opposition by asking that the proposal be rushed through the 
House before opponents had time to mobilize opposition, and did not focus 
on how to address their concerns, much less how to achieve their ideal.137 In 
fact, when LBJ asked his legislative aide Cohen how insurance companies 
had reacted to Mills’ three-pronged proposal and Cohen told him they would 
“raise hell”, LBJ only replied with a general “I think that’s wonderful” before 
changing the subject.138 LBJ was somewhat less blasé about industry and the 
medical profession’s opposition, simply telling Mills: “for God’s sake…when 
you get [the bill] out of that committee, you call that son of a bitch up before
136 Recording of Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Mills, 11 March 1965, 
Citation #7141.
137 LBJ asked Wilbur Cohen “Please get a rule [to report the Mills bill to the House floor] just 
the moment they can. You just tell them not to let it lay around, do that. They want to but 
they might not. Then that gets the doctors organized, then they get the others organized, 
and they damn near killed my education bill when they lay around. It stinks. It’s like a dead 
cat on the door when the committee reports you better either bury that cat or get it some 
life in it.” (Recording of Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Cohen, 11 
March 1965, Citation #7141, Recordings of Telephone Conversations – White House Series, 
Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.)
138 Ibid.
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they can get their letters written,” then asking Mills to give the phone to 
Democratic Majority Leader Carl Albert so that the President could also 
exhort him to schedule a vote on the bill as soon as possible “before they 
can generate opposition to us.”139
Even more remarkably, Johnson’s telephone calls also record the 
President schooling the Vice President on Congressional relations, and thus 
give Johnson’s own perspective on how he approached shepherding these 
proposals through Congress. In his advice to Humphrey, Johnson discussed 
the importance of bringing a record of accomplishment to the voters and 
taking advantage of labor union support, though Johnson never referenced 
currying, harnessing, or featuring business support for any Great Society 
programs or other administration priorities. In fact, Johnson even used the 
very example of National Association of Manufacturers and Chamber of 
Commerce opposition to his social programs as an example of when to be 
tough in response to interest groups’ demands, telling Humphrey that he had
threatened the NAM and Chamber by telling them that if they tried to “cut 
the guts out of my program … I’ll cut the guts out of yours.”140
In light of this evidence it becomes quite difficult to assume that 
politicians will reliably avoid “legislation that antagonizes large number of 
139 Recording of Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Mills, 11 March 1965, 
Citation #7141, Recordings of Telephone Conversations – White House Series, Recordings 
and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.; Recording of Conversation 
between Lyndon B. Johnson and Carl Albert, 11 March 1965, Citation #7141, Recordings of 
Telephone Conversations – White House Series, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations
and Meetings, LBJ Library.
140 Recording of Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Hubert Humphrey, 2 March 
1965, Citation #7024, Recordings of Telephone Conversations – White House Series, 
Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.
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capitalists able to fund a massive counteroffensive.”141 In their very own 
judgment, LBJ and Mills consciously chose to do just this.
Of course, despite Medicare’s substantive importance, this paper has 
only examined one particular program in one particular context, so the usual 
caveats about its potential generalizability of course apply. However, as the 
United States political system has typically been considered to be among the
most favorable towards businesses’ interests, my results may suggest that 
the business interest thesis may meet even greater difficulty in other 
contexts.
Given that the American political system is usually considered quite 
favorable towards businesses’ interests, what can we learn about the 
American welfare state from Medicare’s case? Though it is beyond the 
capability of this paper’s evidence to sustain a counternarrative of the 
program’s passage, the new evidence presented in this paper does suggest 
that future research on Medicare should further consider the role of public 
opinion. As noted, interviews with Mills years later indicate that he recalls 
public opinion being the decisive factor in his ultimate support for Medicare 
and that he frequently sought to associate himself with the program in public
after its passage. Likewise, Johnson seemed to share this view that public 
opinion could ultimately move Mills at the time: recall that Johnson thought 
he would be persuasive in telling Mills that Medicare would be the “single 
most important, popular thing” that Mills would do in Congress that year,142 
141 Swenson, “Varieties of Capitalists Interests,” 4.
142 Blumenthal, Heart of Power, 179.; Recording of Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson 
and Wilbur Mills, 3 June 1964, Citation #3642, Recordings of Telephone Conversations – 
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and perhaps during his entire career. Similarly, Johnson read Mills the results 
of opinion polls that indicated Medicare was popular and Democrats had 
“done nothing for the old folks.”143 Though this evidence is not definitive, it 
suggests that the roots of the public’s support for the program (or at least 
politicians’ perceptions of this support) deserve serious attention.144
The role of the decisive 1964 election itself also ought not be 
neglected. Whatever factors kept Medicare high on the Democratic party’s 
agenda for nearly a full decade before its passage, only the decisive election 
of 1964 allowed these factors to manifest. In this sense, Medicare’s fortunes 
before and after the election of 1964 starkly demonstrate how, as Huber and
Stephens have argued, the presence of a friendly political party can play a 
“crucial mediating role” in welfare state development.145
Next, though it is also beyond the scope of this paper, Medicare’s 
White House Series, Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.
143 Recording of Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Mills, 6 June 1964, 
Citation #3686, Recordings of Telephone Conversations – White House Series, Recordings 
and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Library.; Blumenthal. The Heart of 
Power. 180.
144 Incidentally, Mills and Johnson were ultimately right to expect that the public would view 
Medicare as an important achievement. After Medicare’s passage, Wilbur Mills gained a 
reputation for being a “miracle worker” in Congress (“Mills The Miracle Worker”, Publisher’s 
Newspaper Syndicate, 6 April 1965, Mills Papers, Box 275) and garnered widespread 
laudatory publicity for his key role in conceiving the program after decades of gridlock on 
the issue (“After 20 Years of Argument, House Tackles A Health Bill,” Atlanta Journal 
Constitution, 8 April 1965, page 5, Mills Papers, Box 275. See also “Mr. Mills’ Elder-medi-
bettercare,” Fortune April 1965, Box 410, Mills Papers).
145 Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State 
(Chicago, 2001). From a macro standpoint, Medicare represents a crucial historical case for 
Huber and Stephen’s theory for another reason not discussed at length in this paper. Though
the New Deal is obviously an important historical case, the circumstances surrounding it 
make it ill suited to adjudicating disputes about the relative importance of business interests
and power: there are plausible reasons that the crash dramatically changed both business 
political power and business interests simultaneously, leaving it difficult for scholars to 
convincingly separate the many effects the Great Depression had on US political economy. 
On the other hand, Medicare passed in 1965 even though there were no sudden changes in 
the economy that occurred between 1964 and 1965; only the election in November 1964 
constitutes a plausible explanation for the sudden shift in the proposal’s political feasibility.
64
passage may provide fruitful ground for research on state autonomy.146 
Though Johnson claimed to many Members of Congress that voters had 
given him a mandate to pursue Medicare, a confluence of factors decided 
the 1964 election that were at least as important as Medicare, including 
Goldwater’s extremist platform, the Vietnam war, civil rights, poverty, and 
the memory of Kennedy’s assassination. Explaining how and why Johnson 
translated his popularity to pass his Medicare program is another interesting 
question that future scholars should closely consider.
Last, but perhaps most of all, Mills’ own role in expanding the program 
threefold is particularly remarkable and worthy of further future 
investigation: there is no evidence that the Administration’s original bill 
would have failed without Mills’ action; to our best understanding, Mills 
dramatically expanded the scope of the bill even though his political 
circumstances did not necessitate it.147
9. Addressing The Problem of Preferences: Tracing Preferences 
Across Strategic Contexts
More broadly, this paper illustrated the vital importance of considering 
political actors’ strategic circumstances when seeking to identify their policy 
146 E.g. Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current 
Research” in, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing The 
State Back In (Cambridge, 1985).; Samuel DeCanio, “State Autonomy and American Political 
Development: How Mass Democracy Promoted State Power,” Studies in American Political 
Development 19 (2005): 117-136.
147 It is understandable that scholars remain unclear on Mills’ ‘true motives’ for the choice: 
by most accounts Mills’ move was entirely unexpected by both his political allies and 
enemies at the time, too (see Blumental, The Heart of Power for both a review of and a 
unique skeptical perspective on this claim). In addition, as discussed, nearly all at the time 
expected the program to pass even without Mills’ addition of Part B and Medicaid. The most 
promising hypotheses seem to be that Mills thought an expansive program would forestall 
the demand for universal healthcare more broadly and that Mills hoped to claim credit for 
introducing a popular program.
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preferences. Identifying political actors’ preferences is foundational to the 
study of politics, especially when seeking to ascertain to what degree various
actors wield political power (such as that of businesses on the welfare state).
Yet, though actors’ preferences must be estimated from their positions, an 
actors’ decision to take a position, as Frieden notes, also “typically embeds 
in it calculations of what the impact of [taking] this position” will be.148 As 
discussed previously and summarized in Table 1, there are a number of 
‘impacts’ actors might hope to achieve by misrepresenting their preferences,
including in order to advance a less unsatisfactory outcome from a position 
of political weakness, to overstate their opposition to extract further 
concessions, to gain access to actors and policymaking processes, and to 
shape policy feedback effects.
Such tendencies pose a thorny methodological problem, the ‘problem 
of preferences’, that researchers cannot benignly ignore; throughout this 
paper, I showed how actors’ true preferences could (and were) easy for 
scholars to miss by neglecting these issues, even from private primary 
sources like personal letters and internal memoranda.149 This evidence 
illustrated how reliably reconstructing the policy preferences of a political 
actor through their statements is exceedingly difficult, and that both public 
and private statements should be viewed through a strategic lens.
148 Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations.”
149 In fact, though historical scholars sometimes assume that access to archival material 
allows this problem to be surmounted with the greatest ease, the problem of preferences is 
probably particularly important for historically minded scholars to consider: historically 
minded scholars often study times of great change in politics and society, and such changes 
often coincide with dramatically different strategic environments for the actors involved, 
understanding actors’ true preferences or motivations during such historically significant 
periods requires particularly exacting empirical and analytic rigor about this problem.
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Nevertheless, despite the importance and pervasiveness of this 
problem, scholars have few reliable guidelines about how to identify actors’ 
true preferences when there is reason to be concerned that they might be 
acting strategically.
Though other scholars have proposed solutions to this problem, these 
suggestions have crucial weaknesses. Hacker and Pierson argue that 
researchers should specify actors’ interests ex ante to avoid this problem, 
ascertaining actors’ preferences from an a priori theoretical analysis.150 
Frieden, in the tradition of international relations, similarly supports such 
“deduction” about actors’ preferences “on the basis of preexisting theory” 
given the problem of preferences.151 However, as the debate between Hacker
and Pierson and Swenson indicates, in practice it is nearly impossible to 
definitively establish ex ante what is in actors’ interests (or, worse, what 
actors perceive to be in their interests). Korpi, by contrast, argues that a 
better approach to overcoming the problem of preferences is to consider 
“the time order in which different actors enter the policy-making process”, 
arguing that those who “initiate” advocacy for a particular policy “can be 
assumed to” favor it “as their first-order preference.”152 Yet Medicare’s case 
shows the weakness of Korpi’s proposed approach as well, as a number of 
policies, including the Kerr-Mills program, Part B, and Medicaid, were all 
initiated by actors who clearly did not truly favor these programs’ 
150 Hacker and Pierson, “Business Power and Social Policy.”
151 Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations.”
152 Korpi, “Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare 
States and Varieties of Capitalism.”
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enactments.
In this paper I illustrated how scholars can seek to overcome the 
problem of preferences by tracing actors’ expressed preferences across 
different strategic contexts. Scholars can expect to better understand the 
impact of strategic context by seeking variation in it because strategic 
context is responsible for inducing the problem of preferences in the first 
place. In this way, just as scholars seeking to understand the impact of any 
variable investigate what coincides with changes in it, scholars attempting to
account for the role of strategic context in actors’ expressed preferences can
learn much from variation in it. Conversely, however, the same logic also 
implies that, without showing how actors expressed preferences change 
across strategic conditions, even the most ostensibly trustworthy sources 
and methodologies may yield deeply inaccurate interpretations.
This paper illustrated two ways scholars can trace how actors’ 
preferences change with strategic context: specifically, researchers can 
trace how actors’ preferences change over time as strategic settings change 
and across strategic settings within time. I illustrated this methodological 
approach by tracing how the NAM, Chamber of Commerce, and Byrnes 
changed their expressed preferences before and after the 1964 election and 
how Wilbur Mills changed his appeals across audiences.
In many of these cases I also documented these actors’ explicit 
statements about their understandings of their strategic environments. 
Statements like these are rare in the historical record but can crucially add 
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to such analyses.
Using these strategies, this paper was able to shed new light on the 
business interest debate’s impasse: all theories would make the same 
predictions about business’ expressed preferences after the November 1964 
election, but they crucially differed in what should have been expected just 
before this event (and across actors’ strategic contexts within time).
Tracing how actors’ expressed preferences change with variation in 
their strategic contexts can thus help scholars appraise the incentives 
historical actors face and the preferences they hold. As Gerring notes, 
process tracing is generally “akin to detective work” in that multiple pieces 
of evidence are “employed for the verification of a single inference.”153 In the 
case of ascertaining actors’ true preferences Gerring’s formulation is 
especially apt: it is unlikely that any one piece of evidence can convincingly 
establish what actors truly prefer because variation in actors’ strategic 
context is analytically crucial to identifying their preferences.
While this problem of preferences may appear of greatest interest to 
historical researchers engaged in the close study of particular cases, its 
importance is by no means limited to them. For example, as discussed, one 
example of how political actors might support a political outcome they do not
truly prefer is when PACs donate money to members of the majority in 
Congress simply because these members are in the majority. Imputing a 
153 Gerring, Case Study Research. 173. More generally see also Ronald Aminzade, “Class 
Analysis, Politics, and French Labor History”, in L. Berlanstein, ed., Rethinking Labor History, 
(Illinois, 1993), 90-113.; James Mahoney, “Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative 
Historical Analysis”, in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative 
Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge, 2003), 337-372.
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massive preference shift among PACs when control of Congress changes 
would be erroneous, though PAC donation patterns still contain a wealth of 
useful information about politics we would like to use. In pioneering work 
estimating the ideological position of PACs, therefore, Bonica includes 
controls for politicians’ majority party status (i.e., a key variation in strategic 
environment PACs face) in order to account for this manifestation of the 
problem of preferences.154 Economists likewise often struggle with how to 
infer consumers’ preferences from choices made in particular incentive 
environments.155 Political scientists also, however, regularly use procedures 
such as content analyses to ascertain various actors’ preferences in ways 
that do not confront the problem of preferences and are thus vulnerable to 
substantially misinterpreting various actors’ preferences, interests, and 
power.
Scholars advancing claims about actors’ genuine preferences – and the
role that these preferences play in determining important shifts in political 
power and institutional development – should thus view careful consideration
of the problem of preferences as a central methodological obligation. Not 
only should scholars, as Frieden argues, “be explicit about how they 
determine the preferences of relevant actors,” but, as we do so, also pay 
careful attention to the strategic circumstances political actors faced and the
“impacts” they might have hoped to achieve with the positions we analyze.156
154 Adam Bonica. “Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace” (Working Paper, 
Stanford University, 2012).
155 E.g., Paul Samuelson, “Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference,” Economica
15 (1948): 243-253.
156 Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations.”
